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THE NEW PRAGMATISM UNDER SECTION
16(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
THoM s L. HAZENt
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which provides for a
corporation's recapture of short-swing profits realized by its officers,
directors, and ten percent beneficial share owners, was enacted to
present a "crude rule of thumb" or objective method of guarding against
"the unscrupulous employment of [corporate] inside information."'
t Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law; B.A. 1969,
J.D. 1972, Columbia University.
1. Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings]; accord, SENATE COMM. ON BANHiNG AND CupaENcy, STOCK EXCHANGE
PRACtiCES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 55 (1934). Section 16 provides
in relevant part:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an
exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or
who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the
time of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or
by the effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 781(g)
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, di-
rector, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is
registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter,
if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with
the Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities ex-
change, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership
at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have
occurred during such calendar month.
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter;
but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or
transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
Securities Exchange Act §§ 16(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a)-(b) (1970). Various autho-
rities have undertaken detailed analyses of the section's background and purpose. See,
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Over a period of years the emphasis in judicial decisions has shifted
from the objective application of the literal language of the statute to a
more subjective, or pragmatic, case-by-case approach under which the
short-swing purchases and sales are analyzed in terms of whether there
existed the possibility of the type of speculative abuse to which the
section directs itself. In conjunction with this metamorphosis the courts
have to a large extent taken away a substantial degree of certainty and
predictability in 16 (b) situations. By 1971 one commentator recognized
that this lack of predictability of result had produced confusion for
courts attempting to find guidelines for applying the pragmatic ap-
proach and had thus created the need for clarification. 2 Concurrently,
the courts were facing new fact settings, and these cases of first impres-
sion have thrown the subjective trend into a different phase-the new
pragmatism.
Within two years of this call for clarification the Supreme Court,
although twice having had the opportunity3 to reinstate certainty in the
application of section 16(b), has, if anything, added to and expanded
the confusion. Subsequent decisions at the lower levels of the federal
judiciary have further compounded the problem.
It is generally a questionable practice for the courts to proceed on
an ad hoc basis at the sacrifice of creating clear precedential standards.
This is especially critical when faced with judicial gloss on a seemingly
objective statute. Furthermore, the current judicial trend in 16(b) cases
becomes even more suspect when it is viewed in light of the contempora-
neous case-by-case expansion of the implied private right of action
under the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions. 4 It does not necessarily
follow, however, that the courts should eschew the pragmatic trend,
since the earlier objective application of the statute created its own
anomalous results. A preferable response would be for the courts to
e.g., 2 L. Loss, SECURTiS REGULATION 1037-44 (2d ed. 1961); Cook & Feldman, In-
sider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (pts. 1-2), 66 HARV. L. REv. 385, 612
(1953); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair Use of Corporate Informa-
tion by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947). See also text accompanying notes 102-
07 infra. For the suggestion that short-swing insider trading can have beneficial eco-
nomic impact see Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 260 (1968).
2. Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for
Clarification, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 772 (1971).
3. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973);
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972), aff'g on other grounds,
434 F.2d 918 (Sth Cir. 1970).
4. Securities Exchange Act § 77q, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule 10b-5 pro-
mulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
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establish both a more consistent outlook in determining the intended
thrust of the statute and more concrete guidelines for the applicability
and application of the pragmatic method of analysis.
At the time of its enactment, 16(b) was the only section of the
Exchange Act which created private damage actions to redress the
misuse of confidential information by corporate insiders.5 Twelve years
after the passage of the Exchange Act, in what has since proven to be
one of the most earth-shaking developments in federal securities law
jurisprudence, a Pennsylvania district court ruled that a private civil
remedy may be implied from the Act's antifraud provision and rule 10b-
5 promulgated thereunder. 6 Subsequently rule 10b-5 has been greatly
expanded to provide private damage actions against persons who trade
in a corporation's stock under the guidance of inside information that
is not available to the general investing public. 7 This is the type of
situation with which section 16(b)'s framers were concerned. The
development of rule 10b-5 as a viable retaliatory weapon for a purchaser
or a seller who is a corporate outsider who has been injured by virtue of
an insider's abuse of confidential information and breach of fiduciary
duty is of more than mere academic or historical significance.
Prior to 1968, when 10b-5's utility was uncertain, the desirability
of extending section 16(b)'s coverage as far as was statutorily permissi-
ble was evident; but with 10b-5's development, the abolition of or at
least a more narrow approach to 16(b) may well be called for.8 In
5. Cf. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970)) (which creates an action on behalf of the purchaser against
one who sells a security by making a misstatement or omission of a material fact). See
also Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1970)) and Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)) (which render similar activity unlawful but do not expressly
provide for private redress via a civil damage action).
6. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y.'
1969); cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See
generally A. BROMERG, SEcuRrrEs LAW: FRAuD, SEC RULE 10b-5 (1973); 6 L. Loss,
supra note 1, at 3558-646 (Supp. 1969); 3 id. at 1448-74; W. PAiNTER, FEDERAL REGU-
LAlON OF INSiDER TR iNG 97-316 (1968; Cum. Supp. 1974).
8. See, e.g., Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trad-
ing, 54 CORNELL L. Rav. 45, 61-64 (1968); cf. Gold v. Sloan, 491 F.2d 729, 731 (4th
Cir. 1974) (on petition for rehearing en banc). As a result of the emergence of the
pragmatic trend: "There is no longer any reason for the federal courts to be harsh and
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drafting the proposed Federal Securities Code, the American Law Insti-
tute recognized the arguments in favor of the repeal of the section but
nevertheless went on to adopt and "codif[y] the most important areas of
the Section 16(b) jurisprudence, [while] smoothing some of the rough
edges .... "' This proposed legislation attempts to reobjectify the
sanctions against short-swing insider profits while paying heed to the
problems which were pointed out by the courts in their development of
the pragmatic trend. In comparison to the SEC's goal of drawing clear
lines and establishing at least some degree of certainty in other areas,10
the "rough edges" of 16(b) have become more ragged under the
judicial application of the pragmatic approach and the emerging new
pragmatism.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRAGMATIC TREND
Under the early jurisprudence the courts interpreted section 16(b)
to call for an objective and mechanical application in every case. This
approach began to erode and has now been transposed into a subjective
or pragmatic trend, at least in certain types of factual settings.11 It has
been suggested that the present thrust of the pragmatic trend in section
objective in interpreting and applying section 16(b). Everything that this section was
designed to accomplish, and much more, is presently being accomplished under section
10b-5 and rule 10b-5." 54 CORNELL L. REv., supra, at 62-63. It has been suggested
that the current expansion of lOb-5 can be seen as having eliminated the need for
16(b)'s strict liability approach. See ALI FEDERAL SECURmTES CODE § 1413, Comment
1 (Tent Draft No. 2, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Code], quoted in note 9
infra.
9. Proposed Code § 1413, Comment 2, at 133. See id., Comment 1:
The initial question is whether § 16(b) should be preserved at all. Some favor
its repeal on several grounds: (a) that it is needlessly arbitrary to the point
of being quixotic; (b) that it has acted as a trap for the unwary; (c) that the
Commission has made insufficient use of its exemptive authority; and (d) that,
most of all, the jurisprudence that has developed under Rule 10b-5 (and that
is being codified in part) has rendered obsolete the concept of automatic re-
capture of certain short-term profits of certain insiders.
As will become evident from the discussion below, the "rough edges" have become
ragged by the more recent decisions.
10. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144-.147 (1974) (the new series 140 rules promul-
gated under the Securities Act which provide safe harbors from the statute's reach in
an attempt to give corporate planners and legal counsel a star by which to navigate).
11. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1040-45, 1066-75; W. PAINTER, supra note 7,
at 24-69 (1968), 6-18 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Bateman, supra note 2; Lang & Katz, Section
16(b) and "Extraordinary" Transactions: Corporate Reorganizations and Stock Op-
tions, 49 NoT DAmE LAw. 705 (1974); Lowenfels, supra note 8; Munter, Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the
Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69 (1966); Note, Insider Liability
for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72
Mic. L. REv. 592 (1974). The cases illustrating this trend are also collected in
Annot., 22 A.L.R. FgD. 281 (1975).
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16(b) cases did not actually emerge until 1965 in the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Blau v. Max Factor & Co.,"2 wherein the court looked
beyond the language of the statute to inquire into the question
whether the transaction under scrutiny offered the defendant the oppor-
tunity for the type of speculative abuse at which the section is directed.13
However, the origins of this approach can be traced back twenty-two
years earlier-prior to the emergence of the objective 16(b) jurispru-
dence.
In 1943, the District of Columbia Circuit Court and the Supreme
Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp.'4 took a pragmatic approach to section
17(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,'5 that Act's
counterpart to section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.'6 In Chenery certain
12. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); see Lowenfels,
supra note 8, at 50. While the author did acknowledge the subjective approach which
had been taken earlier in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959) (see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra) and Roberts
v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (involving a "no
purchase" approach to stock acquired pursuant to a corporate reclassification), these de-
cisions were viewed as "[olccasional aberrations" and "isolated opinions" departing
from the objective analysis.
13. The issuer in the Max Factor case had outstanding two classes of common
stock with the board of directors having the power to declare higher dividends on the
Class A stock. The insider defendants who held the other class decided to sell part of
their holdings and in order to make their stock more marketable exercised their conver-
sion rights and received the Class A stock on a one-for-one basis, which they sold two
months later. Since the two classes of stock were virtually identical and the conversion
rights were unrestricted the court found that 16(b)'s remedy for short swing was not
appropriate since "the exchange conferred no opportunity for speculative profit which
appellees did not already enjoy." 342 F.2d at 308.
14. 318 U.S. 80 (1943), modifying 128 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
15. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, § 33, 49 Stat. 838.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 79q(b) (1970) which provides:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by any such officer or director by reason of his relationship
to such registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof . . .
vithin any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to
and be recoverable by the holding company or subsidiary company in respect
of the security of which such profit was realized, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such officer or director in entering into such transaction to hold
the security purchased or not to repurchase the security sold for a period of
more than six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the company entitled
thereto or by the owner of any security of such company in the name and in
the behalf of such company if such company shall fail or refuse to bring such
suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same
thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date
such profit was realized. This subsection shall not cover any transaction
where such person was not an officer or director at the times of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may, as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or
consumers, exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
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officers and directors of Federal Water Service Corporation had pur-
chased Federal's preferred stock which pursuant to a reorganization
submitted to the SEC four months later would be converted into com-
mon stock. The SEC approved the reorganization on the condition that
these insiders receive only their initial purchase price plus interest in lieu
of participating in the exchange, on the grounds that in light of the
policy behind section 17(b)-and 16(b) of the Exchange Act-their
participation would have been "detrimental to the public interest" under
section 7 of the Holding Company Act. 17 In reviewing the commission's
holding, the court of appeals reversed on the basis of an early formula-
tion of the speculative abuse test:
[T]he Commission proposes to annul, not transactions growing out
of an abuse of inside information, but transactions as to which both
buyer and seller were equally informed of the facts-not trading
designed to take quick profits from short term market fluctuations,
but trading for investment by one whose income depended at least
in part upon the success of the corporation of which he was an of-
ficer.'
8
The court reached this result in part by referring to the legislative history
of the Exchange Act provision. 9
The Supreme Court concurred in the appellate court's rationale
notwithstanding the fact that the book value of the common stock, while
not necessarily indicative of what the market would bear, was "consider-
ably greater" than the price paid by the insiders for their preferred
shares. The Court reasoned that not only was there full compliance with
all disclosure requirements, but the insiders "acquired their stock as the
outside world did" and under the reorganization plan were to participate
on the same basis.2 0 The opinion does not indicate whether the result
would have been different had it been clear at the time the reorganiza-
tion was proposed that the common stock was in fact worth more than
the price which the insiders had paid for the preferred. Nevertheless, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court and the Supreme Court in Chenery
were clearly zeroing-in on the question whether the insiders' transac-
tions were subject to speculative abuse.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to give a remedy in the case of
any transaction in respect of which a remedy is given under subsection (b)
of section 78p of this title [16(b) of the Exchange Act].
17. 15 U.S.C. § 79g (1970).
18. 128 F.2d at 310-11.
19. Id. at 308, 310.
20. 318 U.S. at 86.
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TiE SIFT FROM OBJECTIVISM TO PRAGMATISM
The most frequently cited example of judicial objectivism under
rule 16(b) is found in the Second Circuit's post-Chenery decision in
Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte."1 In that case the court of appeals relied
on the section 3(a)(13) definition of "purchase," which includes "any
contract to buy or otherwise acquire,"22 in holding that the exercise of
the conversion rights incident to Park & Tilford's redeemable convertible
preferred stock, in anticipation of a previously announced redemption,
constituted a "purchase" of the underlying common stock.23 Eleven
years after the Park & Tilford decision Justice Potter Stewart, speaking
for the Sixth Circuit in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 4 rejected and looked
beyond this literal interpretation of "purchase" to include any share
acquisition and concluded:
The real effect of [the issuers'] call of the preferred for redemption
was simply to force the surrender of the preference features ....
[The insiders'] conversion of preferred stock into common was
in a very real sense involuntary ... [and] created no opportunity for
21. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1970) (emphasis added). In comparison, the ALI's
Proposed Code expressly provides that "purchase" and "sale" as used within the section
dealing with insiders' short-swing profits are not governed by the Code's general defini-
tions of those terms. Proposed Code § 1413(f) (1). See also Proposed Code §§ 1413
(f) (2)-(5), (g). In some instances the same concepts of "purchase" and "sale" pervade
the proposed statute while in others special rules would apply to the section dealing with
the recapture of short-swing profits. This pattern is explained in Proposed Code § 1413,
Comment 8:
The following table shows the treatment of their several components in § 1413
(it must be remembered that making § 293(f) or (g) inapplicable for purposes
of § 1413 means just that, not that § 1413(f)(1) declares that a particular
transaction is or is not a sale);
Does §293 apply Where treated
§293 to §1413? in §1413
(f)(1) Conversion Yes (h) (1)
(f) (2) Exchange Yes (h)(1)
(f) (3) Merger, etc. Yes (h)(1)
(f) (4) Security dividend No (f) (4)
(g)(1) Gift No (f)(2)
(g) (2) Transfer by death Yes No sale
(g)(3) Termination of trust Yes No sale
(g)(4) Pledge or security loan No (f)(3)
(g)(5) Split Yes No sale
(g)(6) Security dividend No (f)(4)
23. 160 F.2d at 987; accord, Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Another case which is frequently cited for the objective approach is Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943): "Mhe only
remedy which its [16(b)'sl framers deemed effective . . . was the imposition of a liabil-
ity based upon an objective measure of proof." See also, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
24. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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profit which had not existed since 1948.25
Stewart was thus willing to look beyond the form of, and scrutinize the
substance of, the transaction in question in order to determine whether it
was subject to the type of abuse against which 16(b) was construed to
be directed.
While the Ferraiolo approach was followed by the Eighth Circuit
in a similar situation in which the call for redemption was at a price
lower than the market price of the underlying common,26 the objective
approach continued as the Third Circuit reached the contrary result and
found a "purchase" by relying on the Park & Tilford strict statutory
construction.2 7 By 1965, the SEC realized that there was need for
clarification in this area. The next year rule 16b-9 was amended to
exempt from the section's coverage the exercise of conversion rights of
convertible securities.28
In contrast to the judicial treatment of convertible securities, anoth-
er type of non-"garden variety" transaction was uncovered in the area of
stock rights, options and warrants. The Second Circuit adopted the
objective approach in the options area when it ruled that under the
terms of section 3(a)(13) of the Securities Exchange Act the acquisi-
tion of stock rights from the issuing corporation without consideration
could not properly be classified as a section 16(b) purchase.2 While the
courts continued to follow the Park & Tilford rationale by viewing the
exercise of options as statutory purchases, the SEC responded by pro-
mulgating rule 16b-3 which provided an exemption for the exercise of
certain warrants by insiders which had been acquired pursuant to em-
ployee incentive plans. However, considerable doubt was cast upon the
rule's validity and its scope was subsequently restricted by amendment,
leaving the courts to return to their previous position that the exercise of
the warrant or option is a statutory "purchase."3
25. Id. at 345-46. For an earlier application of the subjective approach see text
accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
26. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967).
27. Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); accord, Lynam v.
Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104 (D. Del. 1967).
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1974); cf. Proposed Code § 1413 (h)(1), discussed
at text accompanying note 92 infra. See generally Hamilton, Convertible Securities and
Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TnxAs L. REv. 1447 (1966).
29. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
30. See Keller Indus., Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1972) (exercise
of option pursuant to employee plan is a purchase); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d
693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971), aff'g 300 F. Supp. 1051 (N.D.
Ill. 1969) (insider's granting of an option to purchase with shares put in escrow is
a "sale"); Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962) (receipt of an option to
[Vol. 54
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The comparison between conversion and option rights thus
presented a starting point for the courts and the commission to draw the
line between a statutory purchase and an acquisition of securities which
is not subject to the Act's short-swing proscriptions. In the former
situation, the holder of convertible securities has an investment interest
in the corporation substantially similar to that of the underlying stock;
thus, under the modern view the courts look to the acquisition of the
preferred security or convertible debenture rather than to the date of the
conversion for purposes of applying section 16(b)'s remedial sanc-
tions.31 In contrast, an option holder has no present equity or other
interest in the corporation but, rather, owns nothing more than the right
to acquire such an interest at a future time; it is only at the time of the
option's exercise that the optionee can become the holder of an equity
security. Hence in this latter area the courts look to the date of exercise
for the purpose of identifying a statutory purchase.32
Notwithstanding rule 16b-9 and the SEC's resolution of the specif-
ic question regarding the exercise of rights under convertible securities,
the pragmatic approach continued to mushroom and make its way into
purchase is not a statutory purchase); Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957)
(the validity of former rule 16b-3's exemption of acquisitions pursuant to an employee
plan was questioned but a verdict for the defendant was upheld due to good faith reli-
ance on the SEC's position); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 907 (1949) (exercise of warrant is a "purchase"); Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Johnson,
387 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (applying rule 16b-6's damage ceiling to stock ac-
quired pursuant to the exercise of an employee option); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp.
650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (exercise of option is a "purchase"); Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F.
Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (upholding rule 16b-6's measure of damages); Van Aalten
v. Hurley, 176 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (absolving insider of liability where he
relied on rule 16b-3's exemption); Continental Oil Co. v. Perlitz, 176 F. Supp. 219 (S.D.
Tex. 1959) (same); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (same);
Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. O'Neill, 168 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Mo. 1958) (same); Blau
v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (exercise of warrant is a "purchase");
Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1951) (same); Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Wigmore, 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1947) (same). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-3, -6 (1974).
31. Short-swing trading in convertible debentures is subject to 16(b)'s sanctions as
they are held to be "equity securities"; the determination of whether the holder of con-
vertible debentures is a ten percent beneficial owner is made by reference to his or her
percentage of the underlying stock assuming that all conversion rights have been exer-
cised. See, e.g., Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 603 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975); Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp.,
377 F.2d 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1967); Simon v. Sunasco, Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 92,547, at 98,510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Ellerin
v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959), where it was held
that the issuer's preferred stock which was divided into two series with different dividend
redemption and sinking fund provisions comprised one "class of equity securities" within
the terms of the section.
32. Cf. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 601-
02 (1973).
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other atypical, extraordinary or unorthodox factual settings as the courts
were called upon to apply section 16(b) to various forms of transactions
which do not fall within the garden variety cash-for-stock acquisition
or disposition of securities. The application of this new thrust of the
pragmatic approach which had originated in the conversion area also led
courts to find, inter alia, that gifts,a 3 intracorporate reclassifications, 4
and exchanges of stock between a parent and its wholly owned subsidi-
ary35 were not to be considered purchases or sales of securities within
the reach of 16(b) since in none of these cases was the plaintiff able to
show the potential for speculative abuse of inside information.
Along similar lines, a court's determination of the dates of the
statutory purchase and/or sale necessarily sheds light on its view of the
thrust of 16(b). Most recently, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the earlier
view that the statute, by requiring disgorgement of profits resulting from
a purchase and sale "within any period less than six months," does not
include a closing transaction that occurs exactly six months to the day
after the first transaction under scrutiny. 0
In applying this formula to the non-garden variety transactions, the
33. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949);
Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.
Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), af'd on other grounds sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182
F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950) (per curiam); accord, Proposed Code § 1413(f).
34. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954);
accord, Proposed Code § 1413(h)(2).
35. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954), where the court viewed the exchange as "a mere transfer between corporate
pockets," with the parent "receiv[ing] in indirect interest [in the issuer] exactly what
it gave up in direct interest." But cf. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), where an exchange of stock whereby the insider received stock in the parent cor-
poration in exchange for his holdings in the subsidiary was held to have been a statutory
purchase where in lieu of receiving the new stock he could have elected to exercise his
dissenter's rights for a cash equivalent.
36. Colonial Realty Corp. v. MacWilliams, 512 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), affg 381 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court there adopted the following
method of computation:
[The defendant] construes the words "period of less than six months" to
mean a period the first and last days of which each include the twenty-four
hours from midnight to midnight, and the last day of which is the second day
prior to the date corresponding numerically to that of the first day of the
period in the sixth succeeding month. For example, the period from and in-
cluding January 1st to and including June 29th would be a "period of less than
six months" but the period to and including June 30th would be a period of
exactly six months. Thus profit realized from a purchase on January 1st and
a sale on June 30th would not be recoverable under the statute.
That construction is correct.
381 F. Supp. at 27, quoting Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100,
103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); accord, Morales v. Reading & Bates Offshore Drilling
Co., 392 F. Supp. 41, 45 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
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courts must still determine the dates upon which the purchase and sale
take place within the meaning of section 16(b). Within this context the
issue has been framed in terms of the date upon which the purchasers'
or sellers' rights and duties "become fixed."37 For example, where the
issuer's board of directors had approved the acquisition of the shares of
another corporation from the defendant in exchange for its own stock,
with the formal agreement and approval following two months later, the
court refused to characterize the original approval as the purchase date
since it was "nothing more than an authorization to negotiate' and,
more importantly, the defendant did not incur any obligation to
acquire-i.e. "purchase"-the shares until the formal agreement had
been executed."' Similarly, where the insider grants to a third party an
option to sell the issuer's stock to the insider at a certain price on a fixed
date, the optionor's section 16(b) purchase occurs only when and if the
option is exercised, rather than on the date it was granted, since the
optionor cannot be said to have a fixed obligation until triggered by the
optionee's action. 9
The determination of the dates of purchase and sale may arise in
other contexts as well. For example, with respect to an insider who had
exercised rights under a stock option but postponed payment for three
years, the 16(b) "purchase" was held to have occurred on the date of
exercise, since "[tjhereafter for all speculative purposes he owned the
stock."40 Accordingly, profits realized from the optionee's sale of stock
within six months after his payment but more than three years after the
option's exercise were not recoverable under the section. A similar issue
37. Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210
F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954).
38. Champion Home Builders Co. v. Ieffress, 490 F.2d 611, 614-15, 617 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
39. Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Realty
Equities Corp., 373 F. Supp. 829, 831-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); cf. Miller v. General Out-
door Advertising Co., 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); but cf. Bershad v. McDonough, 428
F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). See also Morales v. Read-
ing & Bates Offshore Drilling Co., 392 F. Supp. 41, 44 (N.D. Okla. 1975). In Perfect
Photo, Inc. v. Sentiff, 205 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1962), on October 8, 1954, an em-
ployee agreed to purchase ten shares of the issuer's stock; on October 23, the defendant,
acting in the optionee's stead, purchased the shares which he sold on April 14, 1960
at a $536.49 profit. The defendant contended that October 18 was the date of purchase,
thereby negating any 16(b) liability; however, the court rejected this argument since it
was not until October 23 that the defendant obligated himself as the purchaser. 205
F. Supp. at 575. See Michaely & Lee, Put and Call Options: Criteria for Applicability
of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 40 NoTn DA m LAw. 239
(1965); Note, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act,
69 YALE L.. 868 (1960).
40. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954).
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was presented to the First Circuit in Booth v. Varian Associates.4 The
defendants entered into an agreement to sell to Varian their holdings in
Bomac Laboratories in exchange for that amount of Varian stock which,
according to the market price on the day before closing, would equal a
sum certain plus a figure based upon Bomac's retained earnings. Within
less than six months after the closing but more than six months after the
execution of the agreement for exchange of stock, the defendants sold a
portion of their Varian stock at a profit which the plaintiff sought to
recapture under 16(b). The plaintiff in Varian Associates maintained
that no purchase had occurred until the exchange took place and the
price under the formula had become fixed. The court, after reviewing
the option and conversion cases, concluded that those cases involved
issues not present in the Varian situation and were not "especially
helpful;" therefore, the court decided to "resolve the question involved
in a manner that is practical and logical and will be most consonant with
the statutory purpose. ' 42 It was then noted that since the purchase price
under the agreement was dependent upon market fluctuations and was
not established until the closing date, speculation on the contract would
be not only "risky," but "virtually impossible." Accordingly, the court
held that 16(b) had been violated since the "purchase" occurred at the
time of the actual exchange.43 It follows that, as in the case of options,
no purchase can take place until all obligations have been firmly estab-
lished.4 4 This type of analysis, which entails looking beyond the surface
of the transactions and considering their substantive nature within the
context of section 16(b)'s purpose, has been the backbone of the
pragmatic approach.
41. 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
42. Id. at 3-4.
43. Id. at 4. The defendants contended that on the date of the exchange they
were acting on the basis of a pre-existing obligation arising out of the contract and
pointed to the section's exemption for securities "acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted." The court rejected this theory since that statutory
exception is limited to "payment of 'independent and matured obligations."' Id. at 5.
See, e.g., Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1961); Smolowe "v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
44. Cf. Kahansky v. Emerson Radio & Phonographic Corp., 184 F. Supp. 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the defendant Emerson had negotiated an agreement to ac-
quire control of Webcor, Inc., and the shares were duly delivered. Three Webcor di-
rectors balked on their agreement to resign from the board. Emerson redelivered the
shares in return for $100,000 above the purchase price and granted a general release
and discontinued pending litigation. The court ruled that 16(b) did not permit Webcor
to recapture the $100,000 since there was no "profit realized" as this had been a
recission of the initial transaction with Emerson receiving the premium in settlement of
its breach of contract claims. See also Hennesey v. Fein, 184 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (transaction rescinded with judicial approval is not within the purview of 16(b)).
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Taking the position that the insider's rights and duties be fixed
before a "purchase" occurs, the courts have arrived at the conclusion
that no section 16(b) liability wil attach if the transactions have been
consummated or triggered by virtue of independent intervening events or
actions. In other words, the section only applies to the type of situation
in which the insider could have utilized his or her access to inside in-
formation to insure a "sure thing" short-swing profit.
There have been, however, a few scattered instances in which
courts have refused to apply the pragmatic approach in atypical fact
contexts. For example, the Fifth Circuit refused to engage in subjective
analysis within the context of the bizarre factual setting in Mouldings,
Inc. v. Potter.45 The defendant Potter, an officer and director of Moul-
dings, placed with his broker, Bache & Company, an order to sell shares
of the corporation's common stock. After the stock had been sold on the
exchange, Bache realized that the shares which the defendant had
placed for sale were unregistered restricted securities which could not be
sold on the open market. As a result Potter's attempted disposition of
the shares turned out to be a short sale. Potter, with Bache's assistance,
arranged to cover the sale with shares held by a group of the defendant's
friends and business associates; in return Potter diverted the "profit" to
the members of the group.46 The plaintiff sought to recapture this short-
swing profit. The defendant took the position that, by simply placing the
members of the group in his shoes, his dealings resulted in a novation of
the original sale. The Fifth Circuit rejected the novation theory since
otherwise it would have been giving its sanction to the diversion of an
insider's short-swing profits from the issuer to a group designated by the
insider, which according to the court would thwart 16(b)'s purpose.
The court then rejected the speculative abuse test since the transactions
in question had been garden variety cash-for-stock sales and purchases.
The Fifth Circuit did not see any "purposeless harshness" in this result
since the facts at hand created precisely the type of situation at which
the section is aimed. Notwithstanding these occasional departures from
45. 465 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. By this time the market price had fallen and Potter did not wish to subject
himself to 16(b) liability by purchasing shares at the lower price in order to cover his
short sale. 465 F.2d at 1103-04.
47. Id. at 1104, relying on the subjective test as defined in Blau v. Max Factor
& Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965). Similarly, in Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), the defendant corporation had
transferred some of its recently purchased stock of the issuer to an employee trust fund
and then claimed that the shares so transferred could not properly be classified as subject
to 16(b): "Gamble-Skogmo elected to become a statutory fiduciary by owning a more
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the subjective approach, however, the trend continued to develop and is
currently undergoing redefinition under the new pragmatism.
THE EFFECT OF TIE MERGER MOVEMENT-
TH NEW PRAGMATISM
The merger movement of the nineteen sixties and early seventies
set the stage for additional 16(b) problems and a new potential for
application of the pragmatic trend. It is within this context that the new
pragmatism arose. Interestingly, however, the early merger decisions
appeared to indicate a retrenchment from the subjective analysis.
For example, in Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. v.
Andreas"8 the court was faced with a "Type C" reorganization whereby
North American Cement Corporation exchanged all of its assets in
return for a substantial portion of the stock of the plaintiff Marquette.
Andreas, the individual defendant, and the defendant Andreas Corpora-
tion had owned a large block of North American stock. Andreas was a
statutory insider by virtue of his position as chairman of the North
American's board of directors. At the time that the merger was ap-
proved, Andreas was elected to Marquette's board. After the stock-for-
asset exchange had taken place, North American dissolved, distributing
the Marquette stock to the former North American shareholders, and the
defendants sold their Marquette stock on the open market within less
than six months of their receipt of the shares. The defendants argued
that there had been no statutory purchase, drawing an analogy to the
"no purchase" approach which had been taken towards an intracorpo-
rate reclassification.49 The district court rejected this contention, reason-
ing that the transaction was more akin to the garden variety cash-for-
stock purchase than to the unorthodox transaction in which the courts
will require a showing of the potential for the abuse of inside informa-
tion as a condition precedent to calling 16(b)'s remedial sanctions into
play.
50
than 10% interest in Western Missouri stock. Its voluntary assumption of loyalty sub-
jects it to the disciplinary effect of § 16(b), regardless of the legitimate purpose for
which the shares were destined." Id. at 742.
48. 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
49. See Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
50. The court said:
This is not a case where the stock of all shareholders is reclassified with some
guarantee of equal treatment for all, but rather a case where a block of stock
is acquired by a separate interest group at a price negotiated by them. Nor
is this a case where the defendants retain the same interest in the plaintiff cor-
poration before and after the transaction., Originally, the Corporation held
North American stock-after the transaction it held the stock of Marquette.
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The expansion of subjectivism under the pragmatic approach, as
well as its extension into the new pragmatism, appeared to be further
retarded by the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Reliance Electric Co.
v. Emerson Electric Co. 1 Emerson Electric attempted to acquire control
of Dodge Manufacturing Company by means of a cash tender offer. But
its efforts to acquire control were subsequently thwarted when the
Dodge management responded by entering into a defensive merger with
the plaintiff, Reliance Electric. Since Emerson had acquired its interest
in Dodge with an eye towards control rather than as an investment
position, it was necessarily in the defendant's best interest to dispose of
its holdings as quickly as possible. Accordingly, Emerson sold a portion
of its holdings in Dodge which reduced Emerson to a less than ten per-
cent owner. Subsequently, but still within six months of the initial
purchase, Emerson sold the remainder. Before the Supreme Court,
Emerson maintained that section 16(b) could not be applied to the
second sale since, with its holdings having been reduced to 9.96 percent,
it was no longer a statutory insider. The Court, through Justice Stewart,
held that the statute's requirement that the ten percent owner be such
both "at the time of the purchase and of the sale" vindicated Emerson's
position."'
Justice Douglas, in dissent, accused the Court of employing the
objective approach to undermine what he viewed as the clear thrust
of section 16(b):
5 3
The acquisition here cannot be thought of as comparable to an involuntary
conversion....
. . . The present case, where the assets of a corporation are exchanged
for stock and that stock distributed to stockholders, more closely resembles the
ordinary Section 16(b) transaction where stock is bought for cash than it does
the unorthodox reclassification, consolidation cases where the courts have had
to go far to find a purchase. In Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corporation,
132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) Judge Dimock held an exchange of the
assets of one company for the stock of another to be a "purchase" within the
meaning of the statute.
239 F. Supp. at 966. See also, e.g., Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971);
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970). In contrast, it has been suggested that mergers not be subjectively scrutinized
and that the courts should revert to the Park & Tilford approach since "perhaps more
than any other transactions, [they] are fraught with the possibility of insider abuse."
Hemmer, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits Pursuant to Merger and Related
Transactions, 22 VANI. L. REv. 1101, 1115 (1969).
51. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
52. Id. at 422-24; see note 54 infra. The other side of this issue, whether "at the
time of" requires that a ten percent owner have such status prior to the purchase in ques-
tion, is discussed at text accompanying notes 147-96 infra.
53. 404 U.S. at 43.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that this
"objective" decision was contained in Justice Stewart's opinion, while fifteen years earlier
he authored what has since been heralded as the decision which formed the basis of the
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[T]he 10% rule is based upon a conclusive statutory presumption
that ownership of this quantity of stock suffices to provide access
to inside information. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d
348 (CA2). The rationale of the six-month rule implies that such
information will be presumed to be useful during that length of
time. It follows 'that all sales by a more-than-10% owner within
the six-month period carry the presumption of a taint, even if a
prior transaction within the period has reduced the beneficial own-
ership to 10% or below. 4
Douglas's position is not without merit and should not be taken lightly
since the Court's holding on its face appears to create a substantial
loophole in the Act.55 On the other hand, Stewart could have reached
the same result on the facts by pragmatically scrutinizing the transaction
in terms of the potential for abuse of inside information. Although
Emerson was more than a ten percent owner, it clearly was not an
insider as that term is generally understood. It did not have sufficient
control of Dodge to prevent the defensive merger and thus presumably
was not privy to confidential information. In fact, one year later the
Court, in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,60
considered this rationale in applying the speculative abuse test to avoid a
finding of 16(b) liability.
In Kern County the Court was faced with a somewhat similar fact
setting.57 As had been the case in Reliance Electric, the management of
the target company opposed the takeover and reacted with a defensive
pragmatic trend. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. Justice Stewart
is not alone in this apparent inconsistency, see text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
See generally Note, Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective
Approach?, 58 VA. L. Rav. 907 (1972).
54. 404 U.S. at 442 (Douglas, I., dissenting). Stewart responded to this objection
as follows: "While there may be logic in this position, it was clearly rejected as a basis
for liability when Congress included the proviso that a 10% owner must be such both
at the time of the purchase and of the sale." Id. at 424. The ALI, while approving
Stewart's analysis under a literal reading of the present section, would overrule the deci-
sion and side with Douglas's position. Proposed Code § 1413 (d) (2), Comment 6(b).
55. See text accompanying notes 177-78 infra.
56. 411 U.S. 582 (1973). See, e.g., Comment, Securities Laws-Non-Cash Ex-
change Pursuant to a Defensive Merger Held Not a Purchase or Sale Under Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 353 (1974); Comment, Reliance Electric, Occi-
dental Petroleum, and Section 16(b): Interpretive Quandary over Mergers, 51 TEXs L.
Ry. 89 (1972).
57. Occidental Petroleum, after unsuccessful merger negotiations with Old Kom's
management, announced on May 8, 1967, a cash tender offer to purchase 500,000 shares
of the latter's common stock which comprised more than ten percent of the outstand-
ing shares in that class. On May 11, Occidental extended its offer to cover an additional
500,000 shares. 411 U.S. at 584-85.
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merger. Within two weeks Kern announced its approval of a stock-for-
stock merger with Tenneco Corporation. The exchange left Occidental
in the same position as Emerson Electric; but, rather than sell its
holdings piecemeal as had been done in the Reliance case, Occidental
arrived at an arrangement with Tenneco whereby the latter could repur-
chase its shares from Occidental. Under an agreement entered into with
Tenneco two weeks after approval of the merger, Occidental issued to
Tenneco an option to purchase the Tenneco preferred shares in six
months at 105 dollars per share in return for Tenneco's paying Occi-
dental a premium of ten dollars per option which would be applied to
the exercise price. More than six months after both Occidental's pur-
chase of the Old Kern stock and its acquisition via the exchange of the
Tenneco stock, Tenneco exercised the option.
The plaintiff, asserting that Occidental be required to disgorge its
short-swing profits, moved for summary judgment and prevailed in the
district court, which held that Occidental's acqusition of Tenneco stock
pursuant to the Old Kern-Tenneco merger was a section 16(b) "sale"
within six months of its purchases pursuant to the original tender offer
and further that the subsequent option agreement was a second "sale",
also within the reach of section 16(b)." On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed, reasoning that the exchange pursuant to the merger could not
properly be classified as a 16(b) sale since there had been no potential
for speculative abuse. It also rejected the alternative of classifying the
option agreement as a "sale" since Occidental's obligation to dispose of
the shares had not been fixed until Tenneco exercised the option more
than six months later.59
58. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
59. It is urged that Occidental possessed the "inside information" that Old
Kern might well respond [to its takeover attempt] by arranging a "defensive
merger" and that, if the terms were sufficiently favorable, Occidental would not
try to top them. But, in contrast to [Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425
F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970)] where the buyer knew
of the imminent announcement of a merger that would enhance the price of
the shares and could largely control its course, Occidental had no knowledge
what Old Kern would do, and certainly did not know that Old Kern would be
able to arrange an exchange offer exceeding Occidental's bid by $20 per share,
with the added benefit of freedom from capital gains tax. We fail to see the
possibility of speculative abuse in a situation where such an offeror simply de-
clines to make a still higher offer or to attempt a block transaction which it
regards as advantageous to all the stockholders including itself.
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnotes
omitted). In the Newmark case RKO controlled Frontier Airlines which was contem-
plating a merger with Central Airlines. During the course of the merger negotiations
RKO independently acquired an option to purchase forty-nine percent of Central's com-
mon stock. RKO exercised the option and realized a short-swing profit when the
Frontier-Central merger was consummated. 425 F.2d at 353.
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The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice White, resurrected
the pragmatic trend (which was thought to have been severely re-
stricted, if not put to rest, in the Court's apparent return to objectivism
in Reliance Electric) when it announced:
In deciding whether borderline [unorthodox] transactions are
within the reach of the statute, the courts have come to inquire
whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which
Congress sought to prevent-the realization of short-swing profits
based upon access to inside information-thereby endeavoring to
implement congressional objectives without extending the reach of
the statute beyond its intended limits.0°
In applying this standard, the Court followed Judge Friendly's approach
below in holding that the exchange of Old Kern stock for the Tenneco
preferred was not a statutory sale."' Additionally, the Court character-
ized Occidental's position at the time that the Old Kern-Tenneco merger
had been announced as treading water between Scylla and Charybdis, in
that the only realistic alternative to participating in the exchange and
subsequent sale to Tenneco would have been to dispose of the Old Kern
stock on the open market via a garden variety cash-for-stock sale
which would have resulted in certain 16(b) liability. The Court neglect-
ed to point out, however, that Occidental could have at least limited its
liability had it chosen to utilize the two-step sale of the Reliance type.
Perhaps by not mentioning this alternative the Court was sub silentio
questioning its previous decision on this point.
Proceeding on the theory that there had not been a statutory sale
by virtue of the exchange, the next question for decision was whether
Occidental "sold" its new Tenneco shares on the date of the option
agreement or at the time it was exercised. The plaintiff's theory was to
predicate liability upon Occidental's disposition of its Tenneco holdings
as of June 2-the date of execution of the option agreement-rather
than looking to the date of Tenneco's exercise which was beyond the six-
month statutory period. This view had been previously rejected by other
courts with regard to the analogous question of whether an option
agreement constitutes a 16(b) "purchase" prior to its exercise."' The
Court in Kern County reasoned that Occidental's obligation to dispose
60. 411 U.S. at 595-96 (footnote omitted). The Court acknowledged some con-
tinued adherence to the objective approach of Park & Tilford and Heli-Coil (see text ac-
companying notes 22-27 supra) but concluded that "[b]y far the greater weight of au-
thority is to the effect that a 'pragmatic' approach to § 16(b) will best serve the statu-
tory goals," id. at 594 n.26.
61. Id. at 596-97.
62. See text accompanying note 39 supra and cases cited therein.
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of the stock did not become fixed until Tenneco's exercise on December
11. The Court also pointed out that as of June 2, Occidental had not
insured itself of a profit since, had the stock price declined sufficiently in
value by the exercise date, the defendant would have been left with
Tenneco holdings worth less than the "purchase" price, notwithstanding
the option premium.
63
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Stewart and Brennan, dissented
from the Court's affirmance on the grounds that the Old Kern-Tenneco
exchange pursuant to the merger was a statutory sale since Occidental's
"status as a sharehold of Old Kern terminated" for value."4 The line-up
of the justices in Kern County presents an interesting reversal of their
theoretical positions which can only add to the confusion of 16(b)
jurisprudence. Justice Douglas, who had vigorously opposed the objec-
tive approach taken one year earlier in Reliance Electric, was now put in
the position of denouncing the pragmatic view taken by the majority in
Kern County:
It is true that in some cases an insider may be required to disgorge
profits even though his transactions do not lend themselves to the
abuses that underlay the enactment of § 16(b). The draftsmen
carefully weighed this eventuality -and opted for a bright-line rule.
As Thomas Corcoran stated: "You have to have a general rule.
In particular transactions it might work a hardship, but those trans-
actions that are a hardship represent the sacrifice to the necessity
of having a general rule."615
Conversely, Justice Stewart, who was one of the earliest proponents of a
pragmatic approach in Ferraiolo v. Newman,66 apparently reversed his
position in his opinion in Reliance Electric opting for objectivism, and
he reaffirmed his adherence to the objective approach by joining with
Justice Douglas in Kern County. Justice Blackmun, on the other hand,
who as a circuit judge had favored the objective approach,0 7 joined with
the majority in Kern County. These shifts in position are more than
63. 411 U.S. at 602.
64. Id. at 607 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Apparently Douglas would only employ
the subjective approach if it would result in 16(b) liability as in Reliance rather than
removing the insider from the statute's grasp.
65. Id. at 610.
66. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). See text
accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
67. My own reaction is that either the statute means what it literally says or
that it does not; that if the Congress intended to provide additional exceptions,
it would have done so in clear language; and that the recognized purpose and
aim of the statute are more consistently and protectively to be served if the
statute is construed literally and objectively rather than non-literally and sub-
jectively on a case-by-case application. The latter inevitably is a weakening
process.
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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mere academic curiosities since the Supreme Court has again been called
upon to clarify the applicability of section 16(b) to the unorthodox
corporate consolidation.6" Unfortunately, the lower court decisions
which have been announced in the wake of Kern County have only
added to the confusion by their lack of consistency in the application of
this new pragmatism.
The other side of the Kern County coin was at issue in Gold v.
Sloan,69 in which the Fourth Circuit was asked to decide whether an
exchange of stock pursuant to a merger between the Atlantic Research
and Susquehanna corporations constituted a "purchase" under 16(b). 70
Within less than six months after the merger had been consummated the
defendant insiders sold their newly acquired Susquehanna holdings at a
profit. The Fourth Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in
Kern County as having "resolved [the] conflict and adopted what had
earlier been described as a 'pragmatic rather than technical' test."''1 In
applying this ad hoc test, the court deemed it necessary "to examine the
particular situation of each defendant as it relates to the merger." 72
Three of the defendants in Gold had no contact whatsoever with
the merger negotiations and thus were held to have had no access to
Susquehanna's inside information. In contrast, the fourth defendant,
Arthur Sloan, Atlantic's chief executive officer had been "in complete
charge of the negotiations" and "had access to the books and records of
Susquehanna during this period" which in the eyes of the court created
the possibility of abuse.73 This bifurcated analysis led to the "somewhat
paradoxical, but unavoidable" conclusion that as to Arthur Sloan the
merger constituted a "purchase" of the Susquehanna shares, whereas
there had been no statutory purchase, and thus no section 16(b)
68. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975). See text accompanying notes 86-91, 181-190 infra.
69. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). See, e.g.,
Note, Securities Exchange Act Section 16(b): Fourth Circuit Harvests Some Kernels of
Gold, 42 FonuHAm L. REv. 852 (1974); Recent Developments, Securities-Section, 16(b)
-Mergers as a "Purchase," 20 WAYNE L. REy. 1415 (1974).
70. Atlantic Research Corporation had merged into the Susquehanna Corporation
via an exchange of stock; the defendants in Gold had been holders of Atlantic stock
for more than six months prior to the merger negotiations, thus eliminating the problem
of whether the exchange was a section 16(b) "sale," which had been dealt with in the
Kern County decision. The defendants were also officers and directors of Atlantic and
under the terms of the merger agreement occupied similar positions with respect to Sus-
quehanna, the surviving corporation.
71. 486 F.2d at 343.
72. Id. at 344.
73. Id. at 351-52,
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liability, on the part of the other insiders. 74
Judge Winter took issue with the majority's treatment of Kern
County on the ground that there the Court had been presented with an
unorthodox "sale" or closing transaction while here the question was the
unorthodoxy of the alleged "purchase." He further maintained that the
Gold majority was incorrect in limiting the scope of its pragmatic
inquiry to the possibility of speculative abuse "prior to" the merger
while taking the position that any postmerger access to inside informa-
tion would be "irrelevant" under the Kern County test. 5 Winter also
pointed out that any such prior access to Susquehanna's books and
records could not correctly be presumed to have been obtained by
reason of the defendants' "relationship to the issuer"--Susquehanna-
since they did not occupy an official position with the surviving corpora-
tion until after the merger had been closed. The Fourth Circuit thus
took the position that the inside information must be presumed to have
been obtained before both the section 16(b) "purchase" and "sale."
76
While the Fourth Circuit majority was certainly correct in reason-
ing that one who negotiates a merger will have access to the other
corporation's books, its analysis would be better geared to a rule 10b-5
action since section 16(b) by its terms is addressed to the relatively
narrow situation in which such access is presumed solely on the basis of
being a statutory insider. It does not apply to all persons who might have
ingress to a corporation's inner workings by reason of his or her holding
some other position. In his opinion dissenting from the court's denial of
Gold's motion for an en banc rehearing, Chief Judge Haynsworth would
have absolved all four defendants on similar grounds, since in a merger
situation one who thereby becomes an officer or director has a "position
as an insider [which] is more technical than substantive. 77 The Gold
74. Id. at 352. See also Morales v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 352 F. Supp. 941,
944-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (similar distinction).
75. 486 F.2d at 354 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Cf. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 607-15 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975); see text accompanying notes 147-96
infra.
77. 491 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir. 1974). Haynsworth made the point that Atlan-
tie's and Susquehanna's full and honest compliance with the SEC's disclosure require-
ments had ensured that "all relevant information be disclosed to all stockholders" and
thus there could not have been any "relevant inside information rIm] the exclusive pos-
session of the insider":
In the usual merger situation, therefore, there is simply no potential for abuse
by insiders of the sort contemplated by § 16(b). Unless the insider has done
something to alter his position relative to other stockholders, no such exchange
ought to terminate an old holding period and start a new one running. When
the insider's advantage, derived from the exchange, does not differ in kind or
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situation thus raises several questions which the Supreme Court left
unanswered in Kern County, the most striking of which is whether the
Court anticipated that its decision would be used as the basis for the
somewhat incongruous result of treating the same transaction as a
section 16(b) "purchase" for some insiders but not for others.
In American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.78 the Second Circuit was
faced with what might be termed as "Kern County and Gold revisited."
Crane had engaged in substantial open market purchases of Air Brake
Company stock with an eye towards merger. After the merger negotia-
tions had been terminated by Air Brake's refusal of Crane's offer, Crane
resumed its open market aotivities, acquiring more than ten percent
ownership. On January 26, 1968, Air Brake countered Crane's efforts
by arranging for a defensive merger with American Standard, Crane's
largest competitor. In April and May, Crane purchased additional
shares pursuant to a tender offer and three extensions thereof. On May
16 Air Brake shareholders approved the merger with American Stan-
dard which was effective on June 7. By June 13, pursuant to the terms
of the merger, Crane had exchanged its Air Brake holdings for a large
block of American Standard convertible preferred stock which it sold on
that date for ten million dollars over what it had paid for the Air Brake
shares. The plaintiff proposed three alternative theories for finding
Crane liable under section 16(b): a) by matching Crane's "purchases"
of Air Brake with the "sale" via the exchange agreement; b) by match-
ing the exchange (i.e. purchase) with its sale of American Standard
stock, similar to the Gold situation, and c) by looking to the defendant's
purchase of the Air Brake shares and sale of the American Standard
shares.
With regard to the plaintiff's first theory, the court relied on Kern
County and found itself compelled to rule that the exchange pursuant to
the merger was not a "sale" under section 16(b) since the record in the
court below contained neither evidence nor allegations that Crane had
access to inside information relating to either Air Brake or American
Standard or to their plans to consolidate. Judge Gurfein, speaking for
the court, dealt with the second theory of liability by reasoning that after
having held that the exchange was not a statutory sale, "[iut would be
quality from that realized by every other stockholder, there is simply no reason
for creating a new holding period for the insider. Starting and stopping hold-
ing periods for the insider when he does something which alters his relative
position with other stockholders is appropriate; it is not when he has not.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
78. 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974).
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anomalous, for the same reasons, to hold the identical transaction a
'purchase'. . . .,70 The court distinguished the Gold case on its facts,
reasoning that in that case the defendant had the same type of access to
advance inside information as had been present in Newmark v. RKO
General, Inc.80 where the parent of the merged corporation had pur-
chased shares of the acquiring corporation after negotiations had begun
but prior to the final merger agreement. The court also pointed out that
in a vigorous takeover battle, like that in American Standard, the
defeated tender offeror would be locked in for six months and that this
result "would act as [an unjustifiable] powerful deterrent on tender
offers."81
The court in American Standard then turned to the plaintiff's third
theory, which had been adopted by the lower court in a decision of "first
impression" wherein it matched the "purchases of the shares of one
'issuer' against the sale of shares of another 'issuer."'8 2 Judge Gurfein
referred to the language of the section which was drafted and enacted in
terms of "the issuer," reasoning that it would be overreaching to read it
in the plural as the district court had done. Somewhat ironically, here
the Second Circuit departed from its earlier adherence to the pragmatic
approach in favor of an objective adherence to the literal wording of the
statute, reasoning that all of the so-called subjective decisions had
involved the matching of an unorthodox transaction in one security
against a purchase or sale of the same security. 3 This then raises
another issue-when is the Kern County approach applicable?
84
79. Id. at 1056. In so reasoning the court was rejecting Judge Winter's contention
in Gold that the Kern rule is to be applied differently to stock acquisitions and disposi-
tions.
80. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970), discussed in note
59 supra.
81. 510 F.2d at 1057.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1060. The drafters of the AL's Federal Securities Code anticipated this
problem but reached the contrary result. Under the proposed legislation the section ap-
plies to securities of different issuers which are, inter alia, exchanged pursuant to a
merger "unless the defendant proves that under the circumstances his purchase and sale
(or sale and purchase) could not have lent themselves to speculative abuse." Proposed
Code § 1413 (g). The drafters go on to exempt anyone who is not an officer or director
of either issuer and does not have more than a ten percent interest in the surviving cor-
poration "immediately before his sale," id. § 1413(h) (2); but this was not the situation
which was before the Second Circuit in American Standard.
84. The Second Circuit had previously answered the question as follows: "The
courts, however, are free to adopt such a flexible approach in construing § 16(b) only
in those cases where the relevant provision is either intrinsically ambiguous or in which
there are alternative plausible applications of the provision to a particular factual situa-
tion." Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1974), citing Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 (1973). This answer does not
leave much room for the objective approach. See note 89 infra.
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The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to answer this and
several other open questions in Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc.85 Provident Securities, a personal holding company,
decided to liquidate. Under the guidance of an investment adviser who
had arranged for a two-step liquidation, Foremost entered into an
agreement by which it would acquire a large portion of Provident's
assets in exchange for the former's convertible debentures which, within
less than six months, were to be sold on the open market pursuant to a
registered public offering. Since the Foremost debentures were converti-
ble into more than ten percent of the underlying equity securities, the
Ninth Circuit held that Provident was an insider within the terms of
16(b). Although Provident's plan "seemed to be a clear case of Section
16(b) liability,"86 both the district and circuit courts ruled in the
defendant's favor.
The district court analyzed the applicability of section 16(b) in
terms of the subjective approach. The court was impressed by Provi-
dent's "all-but-momentary status as an 'insider' of Foremost' 87 and
noted the absence of allegations that there had been the potential for
speculative abuse; from this Judge Schnacke eloquently concluded that
liability here could be predicated only on "an extremely crude rule of a
most deformed and misshapen thumb."88 Although the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the judgment for Provident, it did not believe that it :was
creating any such deformity by classifying the transactions in question as
subject to the Act, and in doing so found the Kern County case
inapposite since there was unorthodoxy in the nature of Occidental's
transaction which was not present in Provident.8 9 The court of appeals
85. 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975), affg 331
F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
86. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
1244-45 n.2 (3d ed. 1972).
87. 331 F. Supp. at 791. Under the terms of the purchase agreement executed by
Foremost and Provident on September 25, 1969, at the closing on October 15, Foremost
was to receive two-thirds of Provident's assets in return for cash and the Foremost con-
vertibles which had been issued solely for this purpose. The agreement also provided
that Provident would be dissolved and that Provident and its shareholders would
organize a registered secondary offering of the debentures. On October 21, the under-
writing agreement was executed and the registration statement became effective with the
sale to the public taking place on October 28. Id. at 790.
88. Id. at 792.
89. The only distinction between this transaction and the usual cash-for-stock
sale is the nature of the consideration. . . . We see no meaningful distinction
between consideration in the form of cash and consideration in the form of
a corporate asset. Consequently, as was implicit in Kern County, the actual-
potential-for-abuse threshold test is not relevant to our determination since that
potential is presumed if the elements of the section are satisfied.
506 F.2d at 605; accord, Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725, 728-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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went on to indicate that even assuming arguendo that the speculative
abuse test were applicable, 16(b) liability would still exist. This conclu-
sion was reached by distinguishing Kern County since the Old Kern and
Tenneco managements were hostile to Occidental, therefore making it
clear that no access to inside information concerning the merger existed,
while "Provident conferred intimately with the Foremost management."
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit, taking an approach similar to that of the
Fourth Circuit in Gold v. Sloan, saw the potential for speculative abuse
in this intercorporate intimacy which gave Provident access to Foremost
information during the course of the negotiations. 90
Another important consideration in Kern County, which was also
present in the American Standard case, was the "involuntariness" of
Occidental's disposition of its Old Kern and Tenneco shares-lest the
unsuccessful tender offeror be left holding the bag. Here, however,
Provident's exchange and subsequent sale were not only purely volun-
tary, they were entered into with an awareness of the potential of their
calling into play the sanctions of section 16(b). Notwithstanding the
Ninth Circuit's finding that both a purchase and sale had occurred, it
affirmed the judgment in Provident's favor on the ground that it had
not been a statutory insider prior to the initial purchase.9' In light of the
alternative and conflicting grounds for decision in the lower courts, it
remains open to speculation whether the Supreme Court will find it
necessary to clarify many of these issues which have been raised in the
post-Kern County era.
The American Law Institute's proposed legislation acknowledges
that in the merger situation, in which an insider participates in an
exchange of stock on the same footing as other shareholders, application
of strict liability principles could easily result in unnecessary harshness
as evidenced by the cases just discussed. Accordingly, the drafters would
codify a variation of the new pragmatism by exempting from its short-
swing inhibitions transactions pursuant to the exercise of conversion
90. For example, assume Provident learned that Foremost had decided not to
declare a dividend in order to maintain the capital it would need to develop
the real estate just acquired from Provident. On the basis of this information,
Provident might have reasoned that the market value of Foremost stock would
rise in response to the news of the acquisition and then fall in response to the
news of the decision not to declare a dividend. Provident might have con-
cluded that it should sell its stock just after the acquisition news, but just be-
fore the dividend news, became public. Such trading is exactly the kind of
speculative abuse that section 16(b) is designed to discourage. Thus, even if
we assume that the Provident-Foremost transaction was unorthodox, we are re-
quired to subject it to section 16(b) scrutiny.
506 F.2d at 606.
91. This aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 180-90. infra.
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rights, mergers and other forms of corporate reorganizations "if the
defendant proves that he did not use information obtained by reason of
his relationship to [the] issuer." 2 With this formulation the outcome of
a particular case could differ from that which would result from applica-
tion of the test which has been emerging in the most recent cases. Under
the approach adopted by the Kern County, Gold, Provident Securities
and Amercan Standard decisions, courts will not impose section 16(b)'s
sanctions unless it has been shown that there existed a possibility of
speculative abuse, regardless of whether the defendant did in fact rely
upon inside information. However, under the Proposed Code, the inno-
cent defendant would be absolved of liability. While in this respect the
code would seem to place the defendant in a more favorable position, he
or she would be at a disadvantage insofar as the plaintiff would not have
the burden of proving that the potential existed. Although the drafters'
comments are silent on this point, it is possible that if the defendant
shows that there was in fact no such potential, then he or she could be
considered to have satisfied the Proposed Act's burden by virtue of
circumstantial evidence. 3
The ramifications of the Kern County method of subjective scruti-
ny have also been extended into cases in which courts have analyzed the
concepts of purchase and sale other than within the context of transac-
tions pursuant to intercorporate reorganizations. 94 For example, in Mor-
ales v. Mapco, Inc.95 the defendant had over a period of seven years
purchased 3,616 Mapco warrants which expired on April 1, 1972; in
addition he already owned some of the company's common stock. Each
warrant, at the holder's election, was automatically convertible into one
half of a share of Mapco common on April 1, 1972; or, alternatively, if
exercised with a payment of nine dollars per option, was convertible into
one full share. The warrants contained an antidilution provision which
protected the holder against the issuance of additional common at less
than eighteen dollars per share. Between February 29 and March 23,
92. Proposed Code § 1413 (h)(1).
93. Section 1413(g) gives the defendant the burden of proving the absence of the
possibility of abuse as compared with subsection (h) (1)'s focus on the absence of actual
abuse, see note 83 supra. Compare Proposed Code § 1413, Comment 12(c), with id.,
Comment 13(a).
94. For example, in Perrine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1974), the court drew from the Supreme Court's subjective approach in looking beyond
the literal reading of rule 16b-2's (17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-2 (1974)) exemption for certain
transactions in the course of a public offering. Cf. Brenner v. Career Academy, Inc.,
467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972); Proposed Code § 1413(h) (6).




1972, while serving as the company's financial vice-president, defendant
sold 900 shares of common stock and exercised 1,100 warrants by
"submitt[ing] $9.00 plus one warrant to his broker . . . The com-
mon stock was then sold and the proceeds applied to the Ross ac-
count." 96 The court concluded that this was not the "traditional 'cash-
for-stock' purchase" and proceeded to apply the pragmatic test under
the Kern County guidelines. Since the warrants were automatically
convertible and contained the antidilution clause, they were considered
to have been the "economic equivalent" of the underlying common. 9
Furthermore, as of March 31, more than ninety-eight percent of the
issuer's outstanding warrants had been exercised pursuant to the one-
for-one alternative in order to avoid the economic loss which would
otherwise have resulted from the automatic conversion. The court
viewed this as indicative of the practical absence of voluntariness in
defendant's exercise of the warrants. A third factor which led the court
to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment was the simulta-
neous nature of the exercise and subsequent sale of common thus giving
no opportunity for abuse between the two transactions. The court also
noted that since the stock continued to rise in price, Ross would have
realized a greater profit had he held on to the stock. While this fact
might indicate the absence of actual abuse and would be relevant under
the Proposed Code, it does not bear upon the key question under the
present test which is framed in terms of the possibility of abuse.
The first two factors which were considered by the Mapco court
are together sufficient to warrant a finding of no liability. However, the
injection of the simultaneous nature of the exercise and sale as an
alternative ground for decision appears to be off the mark. Since defend-
ant Ross had been an insider prior to the exercise of the warrants, he
was in a position in which access to information is generally presumed.
It is quite conceivable that someone in this position could, prior to his or
her acquisition of the stock, gain access to information which when
publicly released would cause a decline in market price. In such a case,
assuming that the exercise of the warrants were to be classified as a
purchase rather than being treated similarly to a conversion, the imme-
diate sale of the common would then be predicated upon the type of
speculative abuse at which the statute is directed.
96. Id. at 97,878. On March 24, Ross exercised the remaining 2,516 warrants. Id.
at 97,877.
97. Id. at 97,879. This situation is comparable to the cases where the defendant
exercised his conversion rights in order to avoid the redemption of his preferred stock.
See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
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The sort of simultaneous purchase and sale in Mapco is quite
distinct from the arbitrage transaction, which is expressly exempt from
the section's coverage,98 where there clearly is no opportunity for abuse.
The leading case on section 16(e)'s exemption for arbitrage transactions
is Falco v. Donner Foundation,9 which, although not generally cited as
such, may have been the first 16(b) case to employ a subjective
approach to the statute. The defendant owned more than ten percent of
Pittsburgh Steel's preferred stock. The company was in arrears of its
dividends by $50.625 per share. On January 8, 1951, Pittsburgh an-
nounced a twenty-five dollar dividend for shareholders of record on
January 19. On the record date, the defendant, for tax reasons and other
financial considerations, sold two thousand shares with the right to the
dividend payments and simultaneously purchased the same amount ex-
dividend. On February 2, Pittsburgh declared a second special dividend
and on the record date the defendant repeated its simultaneous transac-
tions to the tune of eleven thousand shares. As a result it realized a
"profit" which the plaintiff claimed should inure to Pittsburgh under
16(b). The defendant pointed to 16(e)'s "arbitrage" exemption, and
the issue before the court was whether its simultaneous record date
transactions fell within the subsection. Nowhere in the securities acts,
nor in the SEC's rules, is the term "arbitrage" defined. The court
concluded that although the simultaneous nature of the purchase and
sale is an earmark of arbitrage, the transactions in question did not fall
precisely within the ordinary usage of the term.100 While the objective
approach might have led the court to end its analysis here and rule in
the plaintiff's favor, it looked beyond the statute's face and concluded
that the transactions at issue were not within the scope of 16(b):
The arbitrager's position in the issuer's security remains unchanged
throughout his dealings. The transactions are based on knowledge
of existing prices and hence devoid of any speculative element. In-
sider profits by their nature depend on public reaction over a mea-
98. Section 16(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(e) (1970); cf. Proposed Code § 1413 (h) (5).
99. 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953). Prior to 1964, section 16(e) had been section
16(d), see Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 8(b), 78 Stat. 579 (1964).
100. There are three basic forms of arbitrage transactions-i) time arbitrage:
where one simultaneously matches the purchase of a commodity with a sale for future
delivery; 2) space arbitrage: which involves a purchase in one market and a simultane-
ous sale in another; and 3) kind arbitrage: where there is "a purchase of a security
which is, without restriction other than the payment of money, exchangeable or converti-
ble within a reasonable time into a second security, together with a simultaneous off-
setting sale of the second security." 208 F.2d at 603. It is to be noted that in Morales
v. Mapco, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rp. 1 95,094, at 97,875
(N.D. Okla. 1975), it was the exercise rather than the purchase of the warrant which oc-
curred simultaneously with the sale of the underlying stock.
[Vol. 54
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
surable period of time -to circumstances known in advance to the
wrongdoer. But in acquiring the knowledge necessary for success-
ful arbitrage, the insider is on the same footing with all the world,
for his profit is not dependent on the policy or circumstances of
the issuer, but on the coincident state of the markets. Indeed
arbitrage is so clearly divorced from the abuses which § 16(b)
seeks to prevent that -an implied exception could be urged with
some force even absent the express provisions of § 16[(e)].1.1
These considerations would be inapplicable to the transactions in Mapco
where the insider consummated the sale simultaneously with the exercise
of the warrants rather than locking itself in with a sale at the time of the
purchase of the warrants. It remains to be seen whether the Mapco
court's dictum regarding the simultaneity of the transactions will open
up yet another Pandora's box in section 16(b) jurisprudence.
The ramifications of the new pragmatism extend far beyond the
process by which the courts determine under what circumstances certain
types of acquisitions and dispositions of equity securities will be subject
to section 16(b). This currently emerging method of analysis has simi-
larly been applied to the explanation of the definition of a statutory
insider and to the identification of those persons and entities who are to
be brought within the section's reach.
WHO COMES WITHIN THE SECTION'S REACI?
The preamble to section 16(b) establishes Congress's stated ratio
decidendi for conclusively presuming that a statutory insider's profit
realized from short-swing, speculative transactions should be disgorged
to the corporation: "[flor the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information ...by such [ten percent] beneficial owner, director, or
officer, by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by
him from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase. . within any
period of less than six months ... ."o The framer's use of the
conjunctive connection between the initial and closing transactions indi-
cates that the short-swing prohibition was concerned with the statutory
insider who had advance access to the inside information by virtue of his
or her relationship to the issuer. It would follow that an initial purchase
101. 208 F.2d at 604. But see Lewis v. Dekeraft Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. If 94,620, at 96,201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) where the
court refused to apply section 16(e)'s exemption to a series'of purchases and sales oc-
curring within a few days of each other since the transactions under examination had
not been simultaneous and thus could not be classified as arbitrage.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
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which places the would-be defendant over the ten percent limit consum-
mated at a time when there had been no prior contact with the corpora-
tion, could not have been entered into on the basis of special informa-
tion obtained by reason of such a relationship. However, this
construction had been universally rejected by the courts prior to the
emergence of the new pragmatism. Before embarking on an analysis of
this problem, it is worthwhile to examine the nature of the class of
persons who fall within the presumption established by the Act.
The Legislative Background
On its face the section applies to officers and directors of the
issuing corporation as well as to persons who are "directly or indirectly"
beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a class of equity securi-
ties. 08 It is interesting to note the process by which Congress arrived at
the arbitrary ten percent figure. The draft legislation in its early form
provided that the limit be set at five percent beneficial ownership on the
theory that this degree of ownership is of sufficient magnitude to
"practically constitute" such proximity to corporate management so as
to justify the classification of the five percent owner as an insider with
access to inside information which he or she could use for his or her "own
enrichment."'10 4 During the course of the senate hearings it was suggest-
ed that this provision was overbroad-a five percent owner, unlike an
officer or director, does not owe any fiduciary responsibility to the
remaining shareholders. In response it was pointed out that theprimary
factor here was not the traditional common law definition of fiduciary
duties but rather access to inside or confidential information by reason
of the relationship to the corporation in and of itself .10°
The establishment of a fixed figure of equity ownership is thus a
manifestation of the legislature's "crude rule of thumb" approach in not
requiring a showing of actual control or access to information, but
alternatively to create a figure at which such access could be reasonably
presumed. Later on in the senate hearings it was suggested that the
trigger be raised from five to twenty percent in order to avoid overreach-
ing by the statute, 10 but Congress eventually arrived at a compromise
103. See Proposed Code § 604(a) which speaks in terms of "the beneficial owner
of more than ten per cent," eliminating the current "directly or indirectly" qualification.
It is not clear whether this deletion was intended to eliminate many of the issues dis-
cussed herein.
104. Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 16, at 7741.
105. Id. at 7742-43.
106. Id. at 7743.
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and increased the percentage from five to ten percent.10 Notwithstand-
big Congressional efforts to arrive at an objective standard, albeit a
crude one, in the area of defining who is subject to the Act, situations
quickly arose in which courts had to look beyond the Act's language in
order to determine if the alleged insider was within the purview of
section 16(b). Courts have necessarily addressed themselves to the
central question of the purpose of the legislation in determining the
parameters of the Act's coverage.
Who is a Beneficial Owner? And the Problem of Deputization
The process of determining who is a ten percent beneficial owner
can arise, for example, when spouses each own equity securities of the
same issuer. The question then becomes whether their shares are to be
aggregated rather than attributed to each separately. This problem
occurs more frequently within the context of deciding whether either (or
both) of the spouses is subject to section 16(a)'s reporting require-
ments. The SEC has defined the process of answering this type of
question as the determination of whether one spouse enjoys "benefits
substantially equivalent to ownership" with respect to the shares held by
the other.108
The attribution of ownership between spouses, however, is not
limited to establishing whether either or both is a ten percent beneficial
owner. For example, an interesting twist on this aspect of the problem
surfaced in Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 0 9 in which the
defendant, a director and president of the plaintiff corporation, main-
tained that insofar as he and his wife were residents of Louisiana, a
community property jurisidiction, one half of his short-swing profit was
attributable solely to his wife's account, leaving only the other half-his
half-to inure to the corporation under 16(b). The Fifth Circuit,
relying heavily on the decision below, viewed the federal policy behind
section 16 as supreme and refused to defer to the local law of marital
107. In a somewhat analogous situation, Congress has recently taken the position
that five percent control is sufficient to create a fiduciary responsibility on the part of
the owner with respect to the Act's tender offer safeguards as established in the Williams
Act. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, §§ 1-5, 84 Stat. 1497, amending Act
of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2-323, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1970)).
108. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7793 (Jan. 19, 1966),
which is discussed in note 112 infra. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1100-08;
Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 17 W. Rs. L. REv. 1054 (1966); Shreve, Beneficial Ownership of Securities
Held by Family Members, 22 Bus. LAw. 431 (1967).
109. 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
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residence on the issue of beneficial ownership. The court of appeals
reasoned that to do otherwise would result in "defeat[ing] the purpose
of the statute here under consideration.""10
Under the more recent decisions which have considered the mean-
ing of "beneficial" ownership, it has become evident that even if only
half of the defendants profit in Walet had been attributed to him,
absent special facts, his wife's interest would nevertheless have been
subject to the sanctions of section 16(b). This counterpart to the
problem presented in Walet has been considered by the courts within
factual settings in which the point at issue is whether the shares held by
the statutory insider's spouse, and his or her trading therein, are to be
considered within the proscriptions of the section. The situation has
recently arisen in Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.,"' in which a director
sought a judicial declaration that any "profit" resulting from his wife's
sale of Dow Chemical's common stock within six months of a purchase
by him was not subject to disgorgement under the statute." 2 The
evidence adduced at trial led the court to conclude: "In short, the
resources of both husband and wife are significantly directed toward
their common prosperity, and they easily communicate concerning mat-
ters which relate to that prosperity."" 3 The court initially distinguished
110. Id. at 434. See also the decision below, reported at 104 F. Supp. 20, 24-26
(E.D. La. 1952).
111. 386 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. If 95,294 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1964), where the parties stipulated that a sale by the wife of the di-
rector was attributable to him for 16(b) purposes.
112. Mr. Whiting had been a director since 1959 while his wife, the daughter of
the company's founder, had a large interest in, though less than ten percent of, Dow
Chemical's common stock. Within a three-month period Mrs. Whiting sold 29,770
shares of the common stock from which she received more than 1.6 million dollars
whereas less than four months subsequent to her first sale Mr. Whiting exercised exist-
ing options for the purchase of 21,420 shares at a price of $520,774, the payment of
which had been financed through a loan from Mrs. Whiting. The company contended
that Mr. Whiting was "indirectly the beneficial owner" of his wife's holdings and, hence,
that he had realized a profit which must inure to the corporation under 16(b). In order
to determine whether her shares were to be attributed to him, the court adopted a sub-
jective view and found it necessary to examine their financial relationship to each other.
The SEC had previously taken the position that, at least for the purposes of section
16(a)'s reporting requirements, spouses' shares are generally attributable to each other:
Generally a person is regarded as the beneficial owner of securities held in the
name of his or her spouse and their minor children. Absent special circum-
stances such relationship ordinarily results in such person obtaining benefits
substantially equivalent to ownership, e.g., application of the income derived
from such securities to maintain a common home, to meet expenses which such
person otherwise would meet from other sources, or voting of such securities.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7793 (Jan. 19, 1966). See generally
Feldman & Teberg, supra note 108.
113. The testimony at trial revealed among other things that the Whitings did not
mingle their assets, that the wife controlled her own investments, and that they did not
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the issue before it from the question whether spouses' shares are to be
aggregated for the purpose of determining whether the ten percent
beneficial ownership status has been achieved: "[The question under §
16(b) is more narrowly whether the insider has 'realized profit' by 'any
purchase and sale'....1114
The court then drew an analogy to the "deputization" cases in
which the issue is whether the insider status of a partner should be
attributed to the partnership as a whole, as analyzed in the Supreme
Court's decision in Blau v. Lehman;" 5 in both situations the question
resolves itself into what is meant by the statutory phrase "profits [sic]
realized by him."" 16 In order to arrive at the proper construction, the
Whiting court took the position that each case must be examined on its
facts, following the new pragmatism of Kern County, by characterizing
the Whitings' transactions as "borderline." Accordingly the court viewed
this as a situation that requires a substantive analysis into whether there
was any potential for speculative abuse in the transactions at hand and
in doing so the court placed the burden of proof of its absence upon the
insider.117 The Whitings' segregation of assets and evidence of indepen-
dence of investment decisions were not deemed to be sufficient to meet
that burden in the face of the evidence that they "communicated regard-
ing financial matters deemed mutually important."" 8 This pattern of
communication was held to have created the potential for speculative
generally discuss company affairs, all of which lead the court to conclude that Mrs.
Whiting was not "the 'alter ego' of her insider husband." On the other hand, they were
happily married, filed joint tax returns, had the same investment advisor, although they
maintained distinct accounts, and one year before the transactions in question the Whit-
ings did in fact discuss and revamp the general philosophy of her investments. 386 F.
Supp. at 1132.
114. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). In the course of its opinion the court went on
to conclude that some of the readings of the 16(a) considerations may in fact be useful
within the context of 16(b) and, in particular, alluded to the SEC's position on the
factors to be considered by identifying "benefits substantially equivalent to those of own-
ership." Id. at 1136; see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7793 (Jan. 19,
1966), discussed in note 112 supra.
115. 368 U.S. 403 (1962). See generally, e.g., W. PAiNTER, supra note 7, at 53-
96 (1968), 15-18 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The deputization question is but another aspect
of the process of determining who is subject to the Act and is discussed in the text ac-
companying notes 120-34 infra.
116. See 386 F. Supp. at 1135.
117. Id. at 1135-37. In so placing the burden of proof the court was adhering to
the position urged by the American Law Institute. Proposed Code § § 1413(g), (h) (2);
see text accompanying notes 92-93 supra; cf. Rothenberg v. Sonnabend, [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SE. L. REP. If 91,226, at 94,053 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (whether
a spouse's transactions are attributable to the insider is a question of fact).
118. 386 F. Supp. at 1137. But see Blau v. Potter, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REp. 94,115, at 94,478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court, reached the
opposite result.
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abuse since any inside information which was presumed accessible to the
husband as a director was, under these facts, equally presumed to have
been communicated to his wife. This type of reasoning may well lead to
an additional expansion of the scope of section 16(b) under the guise of
the new pragmatism. By extending liability to both tippers and tippees
of inside information" 9 and judicially incorporating into 16(b) a con-
clusive presumption that such tipping activity has taken place, at least
within the confines of the insider's immediate family, it might even be
viewed as a parallel to recent developments under rule IOb-5.
As was recognized by the district court, the issue in Whiting is
similar to that involved in the "deputization" cases in which, for exam-
ple, the statutory insider is also a member of a partnership which has an
interest in the issuer's equity securities. Unlike the beneficial ownership
problem, however, there is no comparable reporting requirement ques-
tion since the Commission has long taken the position that "[i]f the
partnership holds any equity security of that Company, the director
should file reports in respect of the holdings of the partnership in such
equity securities to the extent of his pro-rata interest in the
partnership.' 20 In contrast, the outcome in the deputization situation
under the remedial provisions of 16(b) is not governed by such black
letter rubric.
The landmark opinion in this area is found in the Supreme Court's
decision in Blau v. Lehman.'2' Joseph Thomas was a director of Tide
Water Associated Oil Company as well as a partner in the brokerage
firm of Lehman Brothers which had realized short-swing profits by
trading for its own account in Tide Water stock within a six-month
period. It was beyond question that Thomas was liable for his pro rata
share of the firm's profit, and the sole issue for decision was whether the
entire profit realized by Lehman Brothers should inure to the corpora-
tion by reason of Thomas's "relationship to the issuer." The evidence
was in conflict as to whether there had been actual deputization of
Thomas to act as a Tide Water director by the brokerage firm, and there
was no evidence of actual abuse of inside information. Accordingly, the
trial court refused to require reimbursement of the partnership's entire
119. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973).
120. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1965 (Dec. 21, 1938); accord,
Stirling v. Chemical Bank, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,810,
at 96,701 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
121. 368 U.S. 403 (1962); see, e.g., 5 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 3071-73.
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profit.122 The plaintiff, supported by a SEC amicus brief, contended
that, notwithstanding the factual findings below, the Court should hold
the partnership liable as a matter of law: "The argument of petitioner
and the Commission seems to go as far to suggest that § 16(b)'s
forfeiture of profits should be extended to include all persons realizing
'short-swing' profits who either act on the basis of 'inside' information or
have the possibility of inside information.' 1 23 The Court rejected this
construction, relying in part upon an early draft of the Act which would
have reached the tippees of insider tippers; 24 and, over Justice Doug-
las's dissent, affirmed the position taken below.
It seems appropriate to question whether in the face of the new
pragmatism this view of deputization will survive. More specifically, the
Court's subsequent decision in the Kern County case accepts the specu-
lative abuse test within the context of an unorthodox purchase and sale.
Under this rationale, is it so unreasonable to go to the next step and
apply the potential for abuse test to the deputization situation? In this
regard, the district court in Whiting, under the teachings of Kern
County, attributed the wife's shares to her husband despite the absence
of any evidence of actual abuse since there was the potential for the
communication of inside information. Certainly, the common economic
interests of a husband and wife are no greater than that of a partner vis
122. Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), wherein the court
relied on Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1952). On appeal in Blau
the Second Circuit reaffirmed the Rattner holding, 286 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1960).
123. 368 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
124. Thus, § 15(b) of both H.R. 7852, and S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. provided:
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities,
owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of
stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered on a national securities
exchange . . .(3) To disclose, directly or indirectly, any confidential informa-
tion regarding or affecting any such registered security not necessary or proper
to be disclosed as part of his corporate duties. Any profit made by any person,
to whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any
transaction or transactions in such registered security within a period not ex-
ceeding six months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer unless such person shall have had no reasonable ground to believe
that the disclosure was confidential or was made not in the performance of
corporate duties. . . ." (Emphasis added).
As to the meaning ascribed to this provision, see Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. No. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess.,
and S. Res. Nos. 56 and 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 6555, 6558, 6560-
6561; Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 135-137. These hearings seem
to indicate that the provision was omitted from the final act because of antici-
pated problems of administration. See also Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F. 2d 231, 236; Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F. 2d 564.
368 U.S. at 412 n.12.
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a vis his or her partnership as a whole. Furthermore, the very nature of
the partnership form imposes upon the partner various fiduciary duties
relating to the partnership's well-being which have no counterpart in the
marriage relationship.
Some six years after the Lehman decision, the Second Circuit in
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.125 seemed to retreat from the position
that the possibility of a tip of inside information is not sufficient to
justify deputization. In Martin Marietta, defendant Martin Marietta's
chief executive officer, who was also a director thereof, was a director of
Sperry Rand Corporation in which the defendant held a large amount of
stock. Within six months of its purchase of more than 100,000 Sperry
shares, the Martin Marietta director resigned from Sperry's board and
the corporate defendant sold its holdings at a profit. The Second Circuit
took note of a recurring pattern based on the defendant's practice of
having a representative on the board of any company in which it owned
a substantial number of shares. This, when combined with the fact that
its representative on Sperry's board had participated in discussions with
other Martin Marietta personnel about its Sperry holdings, led the court
to find the deputization doctrine applicable with respect to Martin
Marietta's short-swing profit. 26 Although there was no evidence of the
actual communication of Sperry inside information to Martin Marietta,
the fact there was some communication relating to the defendant's
investment position presented a sufficient possibility (or probability) of
abuse. 27 In other words, reading Blau v. Lehman in light of Martin
Marietta and the test as spelled out in Kern County, while the mere
possibility of the communication is not sufficient, a showing of opportu-
nity is enough, albeit short of proof of actual abuse.
More recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York was called upon to re-evaluate the Second Circuit's position in the
case of Popkin v. Dingman. 28 The individual defendants Dingman and
Halliday were officers and directors of Allied Equities; in addition each
125. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
126. Id. at 266. See generally, e.g., Wagner, Deputization Under Section 16(b):
The Implications of Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 1151 (1969).
127. In this regard the Fourth Circuit has noted: "The issue is not whether there
was 'actual abuse of insider information' or 'intent to profit on the basis of such informa-
tion.' These considerations are irrelevant. It is specifically whether the defendant 'had
or was likely to have access to inside information . . . so as to afford it [or him] an
opportunity to reap speculative, short-swing profits' from the unorthodox transaction."
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974),
relying on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595-
96 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
128. 366 F. Supp. 534 (S.DN.Y. 1973).
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owned large blocks of Allied stock . 23 Allied in turn held a large block
of stock in Wheelabrator-Frye, and Halliday was the chairman of its
board. These factors were sufficient to establish both as statutory insid-
ers. On March 22, 1972, Allied sold its entire interest in Wheelabrator-
Frye with the codefendants abstaining in the Allied board's vote. Within
the six months preceding Allied's sale, Dingman and Halliday had each
purchased Wheelabrator-Frye stock at a price lower than that realized
by Allied on March 22. The plaintiffs urged the court to attribute the
defendants' pro rata portion of Allied's sale to them individually, hence
resulting in a profit which would inure to Wheelabrator-Frye under
section 16(b).
In comparison to the position taken in the Whiting case, the
Popkin court quickly dismissed the contention that this was an "unor,
thodox' transaction, employed the objective test where the possibility of
speculative abuse was not at issue, and found that there could be no
liability since the individual defendants did not sell and their only
benefit from Allied's sale was too indirect since Allied used the proceeds
of the sale to pay off a pre-existing debt. The court noted that the
interest of a shareholder in a profit by the trading corporation-i.e.
Allied-is only derivative, as opposed the direct interest which a partner
has in the profits of the partnership.1s0
129. Dingman owned between 3.4 and 4.8 percent of Allied while Halliday owned
between twelve and fourteen percent.
130. 366 F. Supp. at 539. The court also rejected the plaintiff's analogy to Blau
v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Blau v.
Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified on other grounds, 363 F.2d 507 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) and Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.
Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where a shareholder was held liable
for short-swing transactions by the corporation. In the Mission case the trading corpo-
ration in question was an investment company the sole purpose of which was to serve
as a holding company for the defendant's investments. Similarly in Lamb the defendant
owned the vast majority of the trading corporation's stock and executed ful control over
its directors. And in Marquette Cement the individual defendant was the sole trustee
of nineteen trusts which held all of the stock in the trading corporation. Whereas in
the instant case Allied was not established for the sole benefit of the defendants, nor
did they exert control as they did not participate in Allied's decision to liquidate its
Wheelabrator-Frye holdings. Cf. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. La Morte, [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,429, at 95,471 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Landy v. United Fruit Co., 305 F. Supp. 254 (D.N.J. 1969). For the factors to be
considered in the analogous situation of determining whether shares held in trust are
to be attributed to the trustee, see, e.g., A. Hollander & Son, Inc., S S.E.C. 586 (1941);
Ohio Cas. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. Sac. L. REP. If 78,412 (SEC
Div. of Corp. Fin. 1971); A. George Bullock, 2d, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 78,363 (SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. 1971); Securities Exchange Act Rule
16a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8 (1970); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4720
(June 18, 1952).
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Thus, in Popkin, as opposed to the other cases discussed above, the
court looked solely at the economic benefit that the reputed insider
achieved directly from the transaction; the analysis there fell short of
scrutinizing the relationship of the insider to the trading entity, or
would-be attributee, in search of the possibility of communication of
inside information prior to the transaction(s) in question. In its attempt
to resurrect predictability in the law governing recapture of short-swing
profits, the American Law Institute's present version of its proposed
legislation reverses its earlier silence on the issue and explictly rejects the
deputization theory as a basis for strict liability by excluding deputies
from the definition of "director."''
A new wrinkle in the deputization issue arose in Alloys Unlimited,
Inc. v. Gilbert'3 2 in connection with a pledgee's sale of the insider's
stock within six months of a purchase by the insider. The defendant
Gilbert, a vice president and director of Alloys Unlimited, had pledged
his shares with Securities National Bank as collateral for a personal loan.
After the pledge Gilbert purchased unregistered Alloys Unlimited
shares. Within six months of this purchase but more than six months
after the pledge, the bank, after having notified Gilbert, sold the same
number of shares. The defendant argued that the proceeds from the
bank's sale could not be reallocated to him for 16(b) purposes since the
bank, as pledgee, had unfettered control over the collateral. The court
responded by holding section 16(b) applicable because of the potential
for speculative abuse by Gilbert. 133 Here, in contrast to its rejection of
the judicially-created deputization theory, the Proposed Code would
codify the Alloys Unlimited approach in every such case by attributing
131. See Proposed Code § 1413, Comment 4. Compare id. § 226 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1972) with id. § 226 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). However, the drafters did not take
it upon themselves to clarify the broader problem of determining what is meant by bene-
ficial ownership, see id. § 604(a).
132. 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
133. If a sale of pledged collateral were to be excluded from the prohibition of
Section 16(b), an insider, after a sharp increase in the market price of shares
recently purchased by him, could, upon receiving inside information likely to
depress the market price of his stock, pledge it for a loan and, when the mar-
ket price declined, simply default in his obligation to put up more collateral
and allow the lender to sell the collateral to satisfy the loan. The same specu-
lative maneuver would be feasible with respect to earlier pledged stock, de-
pending upon the nature of the inside information. We must, therefore, con-
clude that the bank's sale of the shares owned by defendant and held in his
name constitutes a "sale" within the meaning of Section 16(b).
Id. at 619; cf. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960) (where the court enjoined the sale of pledged unregistered securities on the
grounds that this would have been an illegal sale under sections 2(3) and 5 of the 1933
Act, now codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3), e (1970)).
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the pledgee's sale or purchase to the pledgor.134
Both the case law and the Proposed Code present inconsistencies in
their respective constructions of what is meant by beneficial ownership.
The courts have attempted to achieve the purported statutory purpose in
their application of the new pragmatism by examining each case on its
own facts. The proposed legislation would at least eliminate this need
for subjective analysis by adopting predictable rules which would codify
the statute's scope.
Who is an "Officer"?
Another area in which the courts have been called upon to examine
what type of access to inside information is necessary to trigger section
16(b)'s remedial provisions is the determination whether the short-
swing trader is an "officer" under the terms of the statute's definition of
an insider.3 In exercising its rulemaking power under the Exchange
Act, the Commission has promulgated the following definition which
appears in rule 3b-2: "The term 'officer' means a president, vice presi-
dent, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who per-
forms for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions,
corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers."' 8 6 With the
majority of major modem corporations having extensive management
structfires that designate a variety of high level employees as "officers,"
the question becomes at what level of the managerial stratification the
line is to be drawn between section 16(b) insiders and outsiders.
This was the issue before the court in Colby v. Klune,13 7 in which
the defendant Klune, who was the production manager for Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corporation, had realized short-swing profits from
his trading in Fox stock. While Khme was neither a ten percent owner
nor was he officially designated an officer or director, the plaintiff
134. A bona fide pledge or loan of a security does not involve a purchase or
sale for purposes of this section, but this section applies to a purchase by a
pledgor or security lender before or within a period of less than six months
after the date of a pledge or security loan (or during the life of a pledge or
security loan) and a sale by the pledgee or security borrower, within a period
of less than six months after the pledgors or security lender's purchase, of a
security that came from the pledgor or security lender, and any profit is at-
tributable to the pledgor or security lender.
Proposed Code § 1413 (f) (3) (emphasis added); see id., Comment 10.
135. See, e.g., Comment, Who is an "Officer" Under Section 16(b)--Who Knows?,
12 SAN Dico L. Rnv. 378 (1975).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1974). In contrast to having left this question open-
ended, Congress included a definition of director within the statutory text, Exchange Act
§ 3(a)(7); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (7) (1970).
137. 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), rev'g 83 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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maintained that he was nevertheless subject to section 16(b) since he
"performed the duties of an officer."' 3 The trial court, on cross motions
for summary judgment, found that although Klune's duties may have
been comparable to the functions of officers of other corporations, this
factor was not sufficient to render him a 16(b) insider since rule 3b-2's
catch-all provision was held applicable solely to the functions of officers
of the issuer, notwithstanding the fact that his position may have given
him "special knowledge of corporate affairs."' 3 On appeal, the Second
Circuit reversed the summary judgment for the defendant. The court of
appeals, assuming arguendo the invalidity of the Commission's defini-
tion of officer, gleaned the following guidelines for the definition of
"officer" from the thrust of the statute itself:
It includes, inter alia, a corporate employee performing important
executive duties of such character that he would be likely, in dis-
charging these duties, to obtain confidential information about the
company's affairs that would aid him if he engaged in personal
market transactions. It is immaterial how his functions are
labelled or how defined in the by-laws, or that he does or does not
act under the supervision of some other corporate representative. 140
On the other hand, the court reasoned that even if rule 3b-2's validity
were to be upheld, the same type of factors would have to be considered
since the functions of the officers specifically named in the rule "are not
so well settled as to be self-evident.' 141 Under both approaches the court
was adopting a subjective method of analysis, looking beyond the face of
the statute and of the rule by requiring an examination of whether the
shortswing trader had sufficient access to inside information "by reason
of his relationship to the issuer."'
42
The Colby test was reconsidered in two cases involving short-swing
profits realized by the assistant treasurer and the assistant secretary of
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. In both instances the defendant was
held not to have been a statutory insider.' 43 In the first decision the
138. 83 F. Supp. at 160-61; see rule 3b-2, cited in text accompanying note 136
supra.
139. 83 F. Supp. at 161.
140. 178 F.2d at 873 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 875.
142. Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). See, e.g., Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
143. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952). The
transactions in question originated from purchases arising out of an employee stock
option plan under which the defendants' supervisors, namely the comptroller and secre-




court noted that it is not sufficient that the defendant "assists" one of the
enumerated officers in performing that officer's functions, but, rather,
that he or she perform such functions himself or herself in order to fall
within the purview of the statute.144 In the second case of the assistant
treasurer who had been promoted to assistant secretary, the court
applied the Colby test, reasoning that since "[d]etermination of finan-
cial policy, either in a direct or consultive way, was outside his prov-
ince," he was not an officer under rule 3b-2.145 In a subsequent decision
the District Court for the Southern District of New York limited the
subjective approach to alleged insiders who are not among the officers
expressly enumerated in the text of the Commission's definition.4 6 This
can be seen as the corollary to the rule that the subjective speculative
abuse test applies to the unorthodox as opposed to the garden variety
transaction. The absence of recent decisions leaves open the question of
the extent to which the new pragmatism will be developed in determin-
ing the scope of section 16's definition of "officer."
At What Point Does an "Insider" Become Subject to Section 16(b)'s
Sanctions?
By its terms section 16(b)'s coverage extends to all persons and
entities who are subject to the reporting requirements of section 16(a)
with the proviso that: "[tihis subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase .... ,1117 On
various occasions the courts have been confronted with the problem of
whether the initial acquisition which places the purchaser above the ten
percent floor constitutes a "purchase" within the context of section
16(b) or, to put it in terms of the statutory rubric, is "at the time of" to
be interpreted as meaning simultaneously with or prior to?
148 In all
144. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
145. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D. Cal.
1953).
146. Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (corporate vice
president). Compare Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (E.D. Va. 1971),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), modified on other grounds sub nom. Gold v. Sloan,
486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), with Morales v. Holiday Inns, 366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973) (corporate vice president) and Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 365 F.
Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (same).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
148. See Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 607-14 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec.
Co., 434 F.2d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 1970), affd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972);
Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
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instances, with the significant exception of the most recent decisions on
point,140 the courts have adopted the view that "at the time of" means
simultaneously with, thus holding the threshold acquisition of a more
than ten percent beneficial ownership to be a "purchase" for the purpos-
es of determining whether a short-swing transaction has in fact oc-
curred.
The treatment of this issue goes to the heart of the statute insofar as
its resolution necessarily identifies the type of speculation at which the
provision is aimed. The problem can be framed in terms of whether the
ultimate evil is the short term nature of the transaction-i.e. a purchase
and sale, or sale and purchase, within six months-where there is a
potential for speculative abuse at either end, or whether to be in contra-
vention of the Act both the purchase and the sale must be susceptible to
the presumption of having been contemplated and consummated on the
basis of advanced confidential inside information not available to the
general public.
The legislative history in this area is sparse, but one can find the
arguable implication that in 1934 Congress was concerned with the
latter situation, in which an insider has advance knowledge and seeks to
cash in on that knowledge by means of short term trading and by
speculating in the corporation's stock without the down-trend risks
which normally attach to such speculation. For example, in Thomas
Corcoran's frequently cited statement highlighting the objective, or
"crude rule of thumb" nature of section 16(b), he was addressing his
remarks to one who is conclusively presumed to have made the statutory
"purchase" (or "sale") with the intent of taking advantage of a "sure
thing"'150 speculation which would result in a quick profit:
You hold the director, irrespective of any [actual] intention or ex-
pectation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will
be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention
(1971); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956), modifying on other grounds, 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D.
Ill. 1974), rev'd in part, [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FEi. SEc. L. REP. % 95,308 (7th
Cir. 1975); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841
(W.D. Ark. 1956).
149. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. % 95,308 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g in part 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. IlI.
1974); Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975). See, e.g., Note, Securities-Section 16(b)-Initial
Purchase of Ten Percent of a Class of Equity Securities Is Not a Section 16(b) Purchase,
43 FORDHAM L. RPv. 678 (1975); Note, Securities Regulation-Section 16(b)-Ten Per-
cent Beneficial Ownership Must Exist Prior to Both a Purchase and Sale for Liability to
Attach, 53 TExAs L. Rnv. 857 (1975).
150. 10 SEC ANr. REP. 50 (1944).
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or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, be-
cause you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the
director intended, at the time he bought, to get out oil a short
swing.1
51
This rationale was also considered appropriate when dealing with a ten
percent shareholder who was neither an officer nor a director.152 It was
at least partially on the basis of the foregoing remarks that the Ninth
Circuit held section 16(b) not applicable to the initial purchase of more
than ten percent of the stock.15 3 However, in what appears to be one of
the anomalies of the statute, the "at the time of" proviso is limited to the
ten percent owner but no such limitation is expressly placed upon the
liability of an officer or director who purchases and sells within six
months.
Within one year of the enactment of the section, Congress duplicat-
ed its provisions in section 17 of the 1935 Holding Company Act,1 54
which contains two significant departures from its predecessor, the
Exchange Act. In the first place, the Holding Company Act's remedial
sanctions for insider short-swing profits are limited to officers and
directors. Secondly, and more significantly, that section's proviso ex-
empts transactions "where such person was not an officer or director at
the times of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase ....
The significance of section 17(b)'s proviso can be argued on both sides.
First, Congress's express inclusion of officers and directors in the 1935
Act's proviso can be viewed as evidence of intended different treatment
of officers and directors, as compared with beneficial owners under the
1934 Act. On the other hand it can be argued that the text of the later
provision shows that it was a legislative oversight not to have included
officers and directors in the 1934 Act's proviso. While the status of an
officer or director under the Exchange Act has been before the courts on
various occasions, there has been no judicial attempt to draw an analogy
to the Holding Company Act.
In Adler v. Klawans 5 6 the Second Circuit utilized the objective
151. Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 15, at 6557 (emphasis added).
152. Id., pt. 16, at 7741-43.
153. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 610-13 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975); accord, Alis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf &
W. Indus., [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,308 (7th Cir. 1975),
rev'g in part 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. 111. 1974).
154. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, § 17, 49 Stat. 830 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 79q (1970)). See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra. See also Investment
Company Act § 30(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1970), which also provides for short-
swing sanctions without spelling out its proscriptions by specific reference to 16(b).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 79q(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
156. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
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approach and approved the distinction under 16(b)'s proviso. There,
the defendant had purchased a large, but less than ten percent, block of
the stock of Williams-McWilliams Industries; five months later he was
elected to the board of directors. Within ten days of his election, the
defendant realized a short-swing profit by selling a large portion of his
holdings. The court viewed the statute as extending in coverage to
anyone who was "within one of the proscribed categories . . . at some
time" during the six month period within which the purchase and sale
occurred.15 7 The court thus seemed to minimize prevention of insider
speculation as the statute's prime purpose, stressing a broader policy of
curtailing the "widespread abuse of fiduciary relationship[s]"''58 which
today would fall more appropriately within the purview of the more
expansive coverage of rule 10b-5."19
The Second Circuit's strict statutory construction in Adler has been
followed in every instance in which the courts have been faced with an
officer or director who occupied that position at some time during the
six-month period within which his or her short-swing profit was real-
ized. 60 In 1975, the Third Circuit adhered to the objective approach in
its holding of nonliability for short-swing profits realized within two
days of the retirement of the defendant officer and director.' 0' David
Hill had been an officer and director of PPG Industries from 1954 until
September 28, 1971, when he resigned both positions. During his tenure
Hill had amasssed stock options pursuant to an incentive plan. Within
two days after his retirement, Hill exercised the options and acquired
7,282 shares of PPG common and sold 6,800 shares. He duly reported
these transactions to the SEC in compliance with section 16(a).'0 2 The
plaintiff argued, and the court conceded, that a recently resigned officer
or director "is likely to have inside information" that would give him or
her "an unfair advantage over other [outside] investors." Nevertheless,
the Third Circuit recognized that section 16(b) is directed at "only a
very narrow but highly visible form of unfair dealing by corporate
insiders" and ruled that since Hill was not an insider at the time of either
the purchase or sale, the section could not be called into play.105 In
157. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Cf. Gold v. Sloan, 491 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir. 1974).
160. See, e.g., Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969); Popkin
v. Dingman, 366 F. Supp. 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp.
725 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
161. Lewis v. Mellon Bank, 513 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1975).
162. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (1974) (form 4).
163. 513 F.2d at 923-25. The court referred to the Supreme Court's statement in
Reliance Electric that "Congress did not reach every transaction in which an investor
[Vol. 54
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
reaching this result, the court left the door open for the application of
the subjective approach under the new pragmatism with respect to post-
retirement short-swing profits where the plaintiff is able to show that the
resignation had been nothing more than a "sham."'1 64 The utilization of
the pragmatic approach in this type case, when on its face the section
would be inapplicable, would be a significant expansion of the current
trend which so far has purported to be limited solely to "borderline"
transactions in which alternative constructions under the Act are possi-
ble. Such an expansion would be the final step in eliminating any
measure of the objectiveness of the statute and would throw 16(b) into
the same subjective mold as rule 10b-5.
The Adler court's objectivism was extended to a different factual
context in Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb.6 5 In that case the securities in
question had not been registered on a national exchange at the time of
the insider's purchase.166 The defendant's sale followed the purchase
within less than six months, during which period the registration had
been effected. The Court in Grabb relied on Adler's "expressia unius est
exclusio alterius" approach to 16(b)'s proviso and concluded that
since the section did not expressly provide that the securities be regis-
tered both at the time of the purchase and sale, "[ilts silence... may
not be converted into a command."' 67
In reaching its conclusion in Adler, the Second Circuit relied
heavily on Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.0 8 in which the
meaning of the "at the time of" proviso was given its first judicial
consideration. In Stella, the defendant Graham-Paige Motors Corpora-
tion purchased Kaiser-Frazer common stock, which resulted in Graham-
actually relies on inside information." 404 U.S. at 422; accord, Levy v. Seaton, 358
F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1974),
where a director and officer of Eli Lilly & Co. who had realized short-swing profits
within six months of his retirement was held not subject to 16(b). In reaching this
result the Second Circuit made specific reference to the fact that the former insider had,
prior to the transactions in question, sought and received advice from Eli Lilly's general
counsel upon which he relied.
164. 513 F.2d at 925 n.4.
165. 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
166. Id. Section 16(b) by its express reference to subsection (a) is limited in scope
to equity securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act; see 15 U.S.C. §
781 (1970).
167. 205 F. Supp. at 571-72; cf. Consolidated Eng'r Corp. v. Nesbit, 102 F. Supp.
112 (S.D. Cal. 1951). In contrast, section 16's reporting requirements are triggered by
the date that one becomes a statutory insider of a registered issuer or subsequently when
the section 12 registration becomes effective. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
168. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd in part and rev'd in part, 232 F.2d
299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
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Paige owning more than ten percent of the four and three-quarter
million shares of the outstanding Kaiser-Frazer common. Within six
months of this purchase, the defendant sold 155,000 shares of the
Kaiser-Frazer stock at a profit of more than $434,000. Graham-Paige
defended the section 16(b) action, which had been instituted by another
Kaiser-Frazer shareholder, on the grounds that the acquisition of shares
could not properly be considered a purchase within the reach of the
section since it had not been a ten percent owner prior to that time.
While the court seemed to be acknowledging the import of the
access to the information existing prior to the section 16(b) transac-
tions," 9 it went on to hold that "at the time of' was to be construed as
meaning "simultaneously with". The district court reasoned that should
the alternative construction be accepted, thereby requiring that the
defendant have been a ten percent owner prior to the statutory purchase,
the direct consequence would be the creation of a rule under which the
cunning insider could freely engage in the proscribed activities while
insulating itself from the sanctions of the section:
If the construction urged by defendant is placed upon the exemp-
tion provision, it would be possible for a person to purchase a large
block of stock, sell it out until his ownership was reduced to less
than 10%, and then repeat the process, ad infinitum. A construc-
tion such as this would provide a way for the evasion of § 16(b)
by principal stockholders, and render it largely ineffective to pre-
vent some of -the financial evils which led to the passage of this
legislation by Congress.170
Ironically, in its subsequent decision in Reliance Electric'1 the Supreme
Court failed to show any similar concern about the opportunity for
evasion in an analogous situation. The Court in that case, under the guise
of the objective application of the statute, exonerated the ten percent
owner which had liquidated its holdings in two transactions both of
which had occured within less than six months of the initial purchase. It
was reasoned that, since at the time of the second sale the defendant was
no longer a ten percent owner, the statute could not be applied by virtue
of the "at the time of" proviso. The Supreme Court's sub silentlo
rejection of the district court's rationale in Stella appears to throw that
court's holding into a questionable light today.
169. See id. at 959; accord, Falco v. Donner Foundation, 208 F.2d 600, 604 (2d
Cir. 1953), discussed in text accompanying notes 99-101 supra. See also Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
170. 104 F. Supp. at 959.
171. 404 U.S. 418 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
[Vol. 54
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
On the appeal in Stella the Second Circuit, over a vigorous dissent,
expressed in passing its agreement with the approach taken by Judge
Kaufman in the district court..'7  As noted above, Judge Kaufman's
explanation of the intended impact of the section as having been direct-
ed towards short-swing trading based on the presumed knowledge of
inside information obtained in advance of the initial transaction would
seem to be inconsistent with his "simultaneously with" construction. The
situation might conceivably have been different had the court been faced
with a series of transactions in which the defendant already owned a
substantial portion, albeit less than ten percent, of the issuer's stock
prior to its purchase. Had this been the case, the contention would have
been that Graham-Paige did in fact have access to inside information
prior to that time. It can be argued that even this reasoning would result
in a sharp departure from the intended "crude rule of thumb" applica-
tion since such advance access would then be presumed on the basis of
the defendant's holding less than the statutory ten percent ownership
interest.173 On the other hand, the development of the new pragmatism
and application of the speculative abuse test within the context of
unorthodox transactions might well appear to lend support to a different
approach when the purchase in question consists of the reputed insider's
initial investment, as opposed to the situation in which the purchase,
combined with the defendant's pre-existing holdings, bring him above
the ten percent limit set by the statute.
Stella presented what seems to be the easier case to deny liability-
that is, where the defendant had no prior holdings. In essence, Judge
Kaufman ruled it sufficient for the imposition of sanctions if only one
component of the two part short-swing transaction was made with the
presumed access to confidential information. That the statute requires
172. 232 F.2d 299, 300-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); see 232
F.2d 299, 302-05 (-incks, J., dissenting).
173. In his dissent on appeal Judge Hincks criticized the Stella majority on similar
grounds:
mhe basic rationale of the Act was such that only completed swing transac-
tions gave rise to the presumption of unethical use of advance information: if
one purchased stock on one day, became a director on the next, and sold some
of his stock on the next, any resulting profit was not recoverable by the cor-
poration apparently because a sale alone was thought to be insufficient basis
for a drastic presumption that it had been made in violation of a fiduciary duty.
In principle, the same rationale is equally applicable to beneficial owners who
do not become such until a given purchase is consummated.
232 F.2d at 305 (emphasis added). Of course, this view of the liability of a director
who was not such at the time of the purchase was expressly rejected three years later
in Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959), where the court pointed out that
the director and the ten percent owner do not stand on the same footing under the stat-
ute's "at the time of" proviso, see text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
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both a purchase and a sale is beyond question, and for a court to focus
on only one transaction, while conceding that the other could not have
been subject to abuse, appears to be in direct contravention of this
statutory focus. This seems to be another instance in which rule lOb-5
rather than section 16(b) should be called into play.
17 4
The debatable wisdom of Stella's "simultaneously with" construc-
tion and its potential abberational ramifications can be seen in compari-
son with other types of relationships to the issuer and their treatment
under section 16(b). For example, assume that A, who had owned
more than fifty percent of X Corporation's common stock for several
years, liquidated his or her entire holdings at a sizeable profit and that
within six months after A's sale, X Corporation released adverse earn-
ings reports which caused its stock to plummet. As a matter of common
sense, one might well draw the inference that A had advance warning of
the stock's imminent decline. However, it is undeniable that an ensuing
section 16(b) action would be dismissed since the statute on its face
requires both a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase within the six-
month period.
Alternatively, assume that B, an officer of X Corporation, sold a
large amount of X's stock immediately preceding the corporation's
public disclosure of its adverse earnings picture and then repurchased
the same number of shares within six months, when the price had
bottomed-out. As was the case with the former majority shareholder, the
inference is readily drawn that B traded on the basis of advance knowl-
edge of the earnings report. In contrast to A, however, since B engaged
in both sales and purchases within the proscribed period, 16(b) liability
would attach to the differential between the total received from his or
her sales and the lower repurchase price.
In a third situation, analogous to the Stella setting, assume that C,
who never had any contact with X Corporation or its management,
undertook an initial speculative purchase of a larger than ten percent
interest at the low price which prevailed after the earnings reports had
been issued, and subsequently sold the X stock at a profit within six
months. The Stella "simultaneously with" construction, if applied,
would hold C strictly liable under the Act while absolving A. Of course,
this apparent anomaly can be explained by pointing to the purpose of
174. But see Bankruptcy Act § 249, 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1970), which provides sanc.
tions for a single transaction by an inside fiduciary, and Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S.
633 (1963). See generally, e.g., Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate
Crises, 61 MICH. L. Ruv. 1 (1962).
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the section since it addresses itself only to the short-swing speculator.
However, as a matter of business reality and because of the probable
breach of fiduciary duty to the other shareholders, the consequences of
A's acts would appear to be more severe. To phrase the problem in
another way, the question becomes whether the probability of abuse of
advance inside information by C, the initial ten percent purchaser, is
more akin to the situation of A, the fifty percent owner, or to B, who
comes squarely within the purview of section 16(b). If one were to rank
the probable culpability of A, B and C, C would certainly come out
a straggling third. Until recently, however, the courts made no such dis-
tinction between B and C.
An examination of the decisions following the ruling in Stella v.
Graham-Paige Motors indicates that the Second Circuit's resolution of
the problem put the "at the time of' issue to rest-at least within the
context of the initial ten percent purchaser. In the next case in which the
meaning of the proviso was at issue, an Arkansas district court summari-
ly disposed of the question by citing Stella, holding that the initial
purchase does come within the reach of section 16 (b).1T5 More recently,
the Seventh Circuit followed this view sub silentio by assuming that the
initial purchase is subject to the Act." 6
In the Eighth Circuit's opinion in the Reliance Electric litiga-
tion,177 the court continued this trend by applying the "simultaneously
with" construction to the initial purchase because of the "impracticabili-
ty" of any other approach:
Illustrative of some of the mischief that would be permitted in spite
of Congress' -action in enacting 16(b) if we accorded with
[the defendant's] contentions is an initial purchase of as large a
block of stock as 51 percent or more of a corporation's stock, fol-
lowed by a sale any time within six months by the stockholder who
obviously within that period could obtain much inside information
and also could influence, manipulate or control corporate transac-
tions. The deterrence of such apparent potential mischief must
have been within the contemplation of Congress.
78
175. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841
(W.D. Ark. 1956).
176. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971), aff'g 300 F. Supp. 1051 (N.D. Il. 1969); cf. Newmark v. RKO General,
Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Blau v. Lamb, 363
F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). But see Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEC. L. REP. 95,308
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'g in part 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Ill. 1974), in which the Seventh
Circuit expressed its agreement with the Provident Securities "prior to" construction.
177. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), afrd
on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
178. Id. at 924 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court noted that the question of
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The court here, rather than pointing to the desirability of precluding a
pair of short-swing transactions by an insider based on special knowl-
edge, imputed to the 1934 Congress the intent of dealing with an
advance intention to gain access-in addition to the utilization of al-
ready existing access-to inside information within the presumption
established by the section. This rationale does, of course, justify holding
C liable in the hypothetical posited above. But why, then, would Con-
gress have included C while excluding A from the grasp of the statute?
In Kern County the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve
the issue explictly but merely stated that "it is undisputed that Occiden-
tal became a 'beneficial' owner within the terms of § 16(b) when,
pursuant to its tender offer, it 'purchased' more than 10% of the
outstanding shares of Old Kern.' 1 79 However, inasmuch as the Court
did not confront the "at the time of' issue head-on and furthermore
refrained from any analysis of Stella and its progeny, it is quite likely
that the justices intentionally skirted the issue. The argument that the
Kern County Court did not purport to decide the issue at hand is
bolstered when it is remembered that in the tender offer situation, such
as was before the Court, there is not one but rather a series of purchases
flowing from each tenderor. As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Provident
Securities, "during a tender offer, [the Kern County Court] may have
intended that the statutory purchases occur only after the purchaser has
acquired 10 percent."' °80 It was also pointed out that the Court in Kern
County had elsewhere indicated that for section 16(b) to apply, any
access to inside knowledge must exist in advance of the statutory pur-
chase when it ruled that Occidental's short-swing transactions in the Old
Kern and Tenneco securities were not subject to speculative abuse since
"they could not have been based on inside information obtained from
substantial holdings that did not yet exist."',
In Provident Securities the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
dismissing the defendants contention that the exchange of a substantial
portion of its assets for Foremost-McKesson convertible debentures
(which were convertible into more than ten percent of the underlying
whether the initial ten percent purchase comes within the purview of 16(b) was not
properly before it for decision. 404 U.S. at 421.
179. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595
(1973); accord, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 372 F. Supp.
570 (N.D. I1. 1974), rev'd in part, [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Ra,.
95,308 (7th Cir. 1975).
180. 506 F.2d 601, 609 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).




common stock) was not an unorthodox transaction which, under Kern
County, would have required a successful plaintiff to show that there
was in fact a potential for speculative abuse.' 82 This shifted the issue to
the question whether Provident's initial acquisition was to be construed
as a statutory purchase. After reviewing Stella and its progeny the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had not definitively spoken to
the issue and went on to consider the question de novo. In doing so the
court of appeals referred to an early draft of the section:
[Section 16] was originally designed to deter insiders from pur-
chasing stock without any intention of making a long-term invest-
ment... [and] was directed against an insider who has no inten-
tion of changing his investment relationship to the corporation, but
rather has an "intention or expectation" to purchase and sell the
stock within six months. After the pair of transactions is com-
pleted he intends to own exactly the same interest in the corpora-
tion as he owned before he began his speculative venture.
8 3
While in its early form the proscription extended only to a speculative
purchase followed within six months by a preplanned sale, in response
to the suggestion of Senator Buckley the section was rewritten and put
into its present form in order to include within the reach of the statute
the insider who, expecting a decline in price, sells the stock with the
conclusively presumed intention of repurchasing when the price has
reached its low. 84
The Ninth Circuit explained that "there is no indication that the
amendment was designed to alter the section's goal of deterring insiders
from speculating on the basis of inside information obtained because of
'substantial stockholdings.' "185 This is another way of restating the
proposition that the provision was designed to catch only those short-
swing transactions that at their inception are based, or conclusively
presumed to be based, upon information obtained in advance by the
insider, or in the words of the preamble to section 16(b), "by reason of
182. 506 F.2d at 605.
183. Id. at 609. The early draft in question would have made it unlawful for an
insider
Itlo purchase any such registered security with the intention or expectation of
selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by such per-
son on any transaction in such a registered security extending over a period
of less than six months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, ir-
respective of any intention or expectation on his part in entering into such
transaction of holding the security purchased for a period exceeding six
months.
Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 15, at 6430.
184. Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 15, at 6557-58; see Securities Exchange Act § 16(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
185. 506 F.2d at 610 (emphasis added).
19751
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
his relationship to the issuer." Accordingly, the court asserted that since
the initial purchaser can only be classified as an outsider prior to the
transaction in question, and the clear import of the section was interpret-
ed to apply the conclusive presumption solely to statutory insiders, the
purchase in question was not subject to 16(b)'s remedial sanctions.180
This approach avoids confrontation with the possibility of abuse,
recognized by the district court in Stella, by the insider who continually
speculates in such a fashion as to never have more than the ten percent
trigger prior to his or her speculative purchase.18 7 The court in Provi-
dent Securities addressed itself to this issue and extended the new
pragmatism by opening the door for a counterpart to the speculative
abuse test in reasoning that its prior to construction of the "at the time
of" proviso is not to be applied unless the transaction in question has
been effected by an outsider who becomes an insider solely as a result of
that transaction. 8 This qualification to the court's holding renders it
unclear whether the Ninth Circuit would apply the Stella "simultaneous-
ly with" construction to the case in which the defendant owned a
substantial block of stock prior to the purchase which placed it above
the ten percent statutory limit.
8 9
There is an apparent internal inconsistency that emerges from the
Provident Securities decision. The court, in indicating that the prior to
construction is not to be applied to the closing transaction, is imputing
two different meanings to the "at the time of" proviso depending on
whether it is brought to bear on a "purchase" or on a "sale." Clearly,
there is no objective support for this distinction on the face of the
statute. However, the Ninth Circuit viewed its resolution of the question
as providing "consistency of rationales" which "is much more important
than a consistency of terms."'"9 It is one thing to take the position that
the statute is limited to those with advance access to inside information
and quite another to say that an insider can avoid all liability simply by
selling enough stock in the closing transaction to place him or her below
the ten percent limit. This dicta regarding what was intended in "the
time of. . .the sale" situation is the outright rejection of the Supreme
186. See id. at 613-14; accord, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., [1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 95,308 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g in part 372
F. Supp. 570 (N.D. IlM. 1974).
187. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
188. 506 F.2d at 614. "This construction, however, should not be applied to a
transaction that is not an initial purchase but in reality is a repurchase or a closing
transaction." Id. (emphasis added).
189. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
190. 506 F.2d 4t 614.
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Court's reasoning in Reliance Electric, which, as noted earlier, appears
to be called for in light of Kern County.
Notwithstanding the consistency of rationales, the resulting incon-
sistency of terms creates a significant problem of statutory interpretation
which should not be underplayed. For instance, it can be argued that
had Congress fully appreciated the purported necessity of scrutinizing
the initial and closing transactions in different lights, surely the framers
could have arrived at a more explicit means of expressing this dichotomy
on the face of the statute. On the other hand, the simultaneously with
construction is in conflict with the version of congressional intent adopt-
ed in Reliance Electric which would apply a Draconian "crude rule of
thumb" to a "very narrow" situation in which an individual who trades
in a security at a profit within a six-month time span can be conclusively
presumed to have engaged in such activity on the basis of inside
information to which he or she had access in advance of the first
statutory purchase or sale. The Provident Securities opinion utilizes the
new pragmatism to preclude such an interpretation. In any event, the
Ninth Circuit's dicta has presented the Supreme Court with the opportu-
nity to resolve the apparent conflict between its most recent section
16(b) decisions.
Within the framework of the present statute courts are thus forced
to choose between two possible constructions of the "at the time of"
proviso, neither of which is totally satisfactory; nevertheless, it would
appear that the most recent interpretation adopted in the wake of the
new pragmatism by the Provident Securities decision is the preferable
one. Additional support for the construction adopted by the Ninth
Circuit can be found in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gold v. Sloan,'
in which the court of appeals ruled that although three of the defendants
had become statutory insiders of the postmerger surviving corporation
simultaneously with the closing of the merger, there could be no short-
swing liability for their subsequent sales of the surviving corporation's
stock since they had no access to inside information prior to the acquisi-
tion of the stock pursuant to the merger exchange. Conversely, the
fourth defendant, who was found to have had such prior access by virtue
of his having acted as the negotiator for the merged corporation, was
held to be subject to the provisions of section 16.
In this regard the dissenter in Gold pointed to an apparent weak-
191. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). See text
accompanying notes 69-77 supra.
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ness in the position taken by the majority since none of the information
so acquired by any of the defendants could have been obtained "by
reason of [their] relationship to the issuer." The dissent thus urged an
approach similar to the one taken in Stella, i.e. that the court should
have scrutinized the defendants' positions with respect to the issuer after
the merger but before the sale of their stock rather than limiting the
inquiry by a prior to construction.' 02 The Gold decision, when offset by
this aspect of the dissent, provides another example of the courts'
emphasis on the advance nature of the potential for access to inside
information.
Professor Loss, as the Reporter for the American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code, seriously considered but rejected the elimina-
tion of a counterpart to section 16(b),19 reasoning that although the
jurisprudence under rule IOb-5 may to a large extent eliminate the need
for a broad strict liability provision in this area, "§ 16(b) has a symbolic
significance that must be, and deserves to be, recognized.' 94 In the first
instance there is this recognition of the possible desirability of limiting
the scope of section 16(b) while, in contrast, proposed section 1413
broadens, or at least refrains from narrowing, the scope of liability with
respect to the types of insiders under discussion herein:
(c) [Sometime directors or officers.] With respect to a director
or officer (or a person within section 604(c)), this section applies
if the defendant has that status at the time of either the purchase
or the sale or at any time between the two transactions.
(d) [Sometime 10 percent owners.] This section applies with re-
spect to (1) a purchase that makes a person a more than 10 per-
cent owner within section 604(a), and (2) a sale within less than
six months after the purchase that created that status, whether or
not the seller has that status at the time of the sale.'95
In explicitly accepting the Stella-Adler approach, Professor Loss
192. When a defendant becomes an insider of an issuer as part of an opening
acquisition of such issuer's stock, such defendant may be able to use informa-
tion obtained thereafter, by virtue of his insider position, in timing his closing
dispositions of the stock. Such an abuse is exactly the sort of evil that § 16(b)
is designed to prevent. By the terms of § 16(b), a person who purchases stock
of an issuer while not a director, and who later becomes a director of the issuer
and sells such stock within six months of purchase, is liable under § 16(b).
The statute has been so applied. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2[d] Cir.
1959); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7[thl Cir. 1970) (alternative
holding); Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962,
966 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
486 F.2d at 356 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
194. Proposed Code § 1413, Comment 2.
195. Id. §§ 1413(c)-(d).
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acknowledges that the "construction is questionable under the present
language" but adopts this version on the basis that there "is opportunity
for abuse in the event of a sale after insider status is achieved."196
Hence, the code rejects, without explanation, limitation of the evil that
warrants the extreme approach of providing for strict liability in addi-
tion to the presumption of advance access to inside information prior to
both ends of the short-swing transaction. In so doing there is no expla-
nation why the section does not equally apply to a single sale by an
insider. This is one of the "rough edges" that would not be ironed out by
the proposed legislation.
CONCLUSION-WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERB?
Over the past thirty-three years, during which courts have been
called upon to apply section 16(b)'s remedial sanctions to diversified
factual milieux, the emphasis has shifted from objectivism to pragma-
tism and has currently evolved into the new pragmatism. Section
16(b)'s metamorphosis evidences an increasing departure from the
statute's historical "crude rule of thumb" mechanism for imposing strict
liability upon corporate insiders' short-swing profits. This new thrust is
most understandable when considered within the context of the environ-
ment in which it arose. The continually expanding sophistication of the
marketplace forced the federal judiciary to gear the section to new
situations which had not been considered by the framers in 1934 and
thus did not fit into the statutory mold.
In every instance-from the early conversion cases to the most
recent corporate consolidation situations-in which the courts have
found it necessary to scrutinize the substance of the transaction, they
have been able to support their analysis with at least an arguable
interpretation of the drafters' intent although, in many instances, the
contrary result might have found equal support in section 16(b)'s
wording and history. In other words, what had been originally intended
to provide the courts with a self-determining, mechanical formula has
emerged into but an analytical starting point for judicially created
doctrines of liability. At the sacrifice of predictability of result, the new
pragmatism represents a continued attempt to eliminate the potential for
"purposeless harshness" that in certain situations necessarily arises from
the imposition of strict liability.
196. Id., Comment 6.
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The loss of certainty in application has appeared in related areas
under the securities laws, such as rule 10b-5 liability, and may be
nothing more than the inevitable result of reliance upon "vintage"
legislation. Absent repeal of the section, which would place the problem
of abuse of inside information solely within the ambit of 10b-5, or,
alternatively, amendatory action by Congress, all indications lead to the
conclusion that the new pragmatism will flourish and expand, perhaps
even to the point that section 16(b) is viewed as doing no more than
creating certain presumptions which may be rebutted by either party. In
fact, nine years ago, prior to the widespread proliferation of the prag-
matic trend, it was suggested that 16(b) be revised in order to eliminate
its objective inflexibility by redrafting the section in terms of a rebutta-
ble presumption of abuse of inside information. 197 To some extent the
American Law Institute would follow this view today, at least in the
areas of corporate reorganizations and consolidations'08 and perhaps,
regardless of the method of achievement, this is destined to be the wave
of the future.
The Institute's refusal to support the repeal of section 16(b) is well
founded given the current state of the law under lOb-5. The argument
in favor of repeal is premised primarily upon lOb-5's ability to reach the
problems that may arise out of insider trading. This position is merito-
rious to the extent that rigorous enforcement of the antifraud provisions
will act as a sufficient deterrent; however, it ignores a second and
equally important aspect of 16(b)-its remedial and compensatory
effect. Under the current framework the fruits of insider short-swing
transactions inure to the corporation on the basis of the theory that the
insider has misappropriated a corporate asset. 09O In contrast, the Su-
197. Munter, supra note 11, wherein the author also proposed that 16(b) enforce-
ment be taken out of the private sector and vested in the SEC. But see Lowenfels, supra
note 8, at 64:
Congress has many more pressing and important problems . . . .TMhe so-
lution would seem to lie with the federal courts. The development and exten-
sion of the subjective interpretation of section 16(b), the refusal to apply this"crude rule-of-thumb" to situations which could not possibly lend themselves
to the types of abuses that the statute was designed to prevent-herein lies the
most practical solution to what has in reality become a statutory anachronism.
198. Proposed Code §§ 1413(g), (h)(1).
199. Cf. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (profit from trading on advance
knowledge of the inaccuracy of an earnings projection should inure to the corporation);
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969)
(premium received for the sale of control should be prorated among all shareholders);
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (profit




preme Court has recently limited 1Ob-5 actions to purchasers and sellers
of the securities, thus precluding recovery by the issuing corporation in
the normal 16(b) situation.2 0 It follows that the repeal of section
16(b) would go beyond the elimination of seemingly duplicative sanc-
tions and would recast the compensatory focus of the present law-a
result which has not been called for even by the section's harshest critics.
While the new pragmatism has its drawbacks, principally the lack
of certainty which has followed from its case-by-case application, it
appears to be the most satisfactory solution if applied in moderation.
The courts must be mindful, however, that rule lOb-5's availability not
only provides an effective weapon in and of itself but also eliminates the
need for the unbridled expansion of section 16(b). The increasing
complexity of securities transactions may well render a simple formula
impracticable. Furthermore, as the courts continue to be confronted
with "hard" fact settings, they should be able to develop a consistency of
rationales which will reinject some degree of predictability without
creating the type of rigidity that results in unfairness and that has led the
courts to depart from the "crude rule of thumb" in striving for a refined
rule of reason.
200. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Interestingly,
the proposed legislation is silent on the issue of standing to sue in 10b-5 situations and
thus would permit the courts to reach the contrary result. See Proposed Code § 1423,
Comment 5.
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